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ABSTRACT

This study focused upon assessing various relationships between
the presence or absence of a transitional object in early childhood
and aspects of psychological functioning in later life.

The nature of

the inanimate object attachments were determined by stringent criteria
involving both self- and parental-reports.

Personality differences

were found between those subjects demonstrating strong singular
attachments that persisted for a considerable period of time and
those having no such significant attachments.

The nature of what

might be considered optimal object attachments was discussed in
light of the findings.

vii

CHAPTER I

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The recognition by parents of the importance of special objects
in the lives of their children has been commonly acknowledged.
it has become an area of psychological scrutiny.

Recently

Winnicott (1953) was

the first to express the importance of these blankets, teddy bears, and
other cuddly toys and objects in the normal development of the child.
The nature of Winnicott's concept of transitional objects and transi
tional phenomena has yielded a new and fascinating perspective of the
psychological growth of the very young child.

From its inception it

was readily supported and adopted, though it has not been without its
critics.

It has been related to a diverse spectrum of developmental

issues ranging from the earliest symbolic capacities of the infant and
various aspects of the separation-individuation process to the level of
an individual's object relations.

To thoroughly grasp the magnitude of

Winnicott's contribution it is necessary to view this concept from a
broad perspective.
The theoretical framework upon which the concepts of transitional
objects and transitional phenomena are based stems from classical psycho
analytic theory and the more recent developments in object relations
theory.

The specific terminology used by these schools of thought to
1
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describe these dynamic formulations is necessary in order to provide an
adequate understanding of the concepts.

Without remaining within this

framework much of the meaning of the transitional object is lost.
In this review of the concept of the transitional object, empha
sis is placed upon:

Winnicott's original thinking and its elaboration

over the years; the distinction between normal and pathological usage of
an object; the extention of Winnicott's concepts by other theoreticians;
the relationship to everyday creativity; applications to clinical prob
lems and issues; as well as some empirical investigations that have
attempted to objectively assess dimensions of this area.

Winnicott's Contribution
Winnicott's formulations of the transitional object serve as the
basic framework by which other investigators and theoreticians view this
phenomena.

Winnicott (1953) considered the use of the transitional

object to be a developmental progression from the infant's initial oral
activities.

He suggested that, "there is a wide variation to be found

in a sequence of events which starts with the newborn infant's fist-in
mouth activities, and that leads eventually on to an attachment to a
teddy, a doll or a soft toy, or hard toy" (p. 89).

Winnicott recog

nized their supportive nature in helping children deal with the emo
tionally arousing aspects or separation from the mother.

This "separ

ation anxiety" Winnicott believes can be dealt with by the creation of
a symbolic representation of the mother in the form of a special object.
But more importantly though is the role of the transitional object as a
crucial element in the development away from total dependence on the
mother to the child's growing independence.

This area of experience
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or "transitional period" marks an important aspect of life for the
child.

Winnicott

. . . introduced the terms "transitional object" and "transi
tional phenomena" for the designation of the intermediate
area of experience, between thumb and teddy bear, between
the oral eroticism and true object relationship, between
primary unawareness of indebtedness and the acknowledgment
of indebtedness ("Say: ta!") (p. 89).
The relationship between these early oral activities and the
later development of a transitional object is extremely important in
Winnicott's conceptualization, as it recognizes a shift from one mode
of experience to another.

It is the role of the transitional object

as the "first not-me possession" which marks the growing distinction
and differentiation between inner reality (i.e., archaic thinking of
the primary process) and outer reality (i.e., secondary process think
ing involving rational object-directed activity).

It is during this

period that the child is moving from a "subjective" inner world of
experience to the external "objective" world of experience.

The

transitional period bridges this maturational process of experiential
functioning.

It should be noted that Winnicott's formulation goes

one step further than merely indicating a primary mode of dealing
with inner and outer reality.

Inherent in his concepts of transi

tional objects and transitional phenomena is the location of what he
refers to as "transitional space."

This area of experience is the

"third part of life" of the individual.

It

. . . is an intermediate area of experiencing to which inner
reality and external life both contribute. It is an area
which is not challenged, because no claim is made on its
behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the
individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping
inner and outer reality separate yet inter-related (p. 90).
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A critical aspect in understanding the transitional object is
the necessity to focus upon the role of "illusion" as it relates upon
the infant's early instinctual needs which must subsequently give way
to reality and its acceptance.

The infant initially is extremely

dependent upon the mother figure who must meet its every need.

It is

the nature of this early mother-infant interaction that serves as the
basis for the development of good illusion.

If the mother's care and

devotion provide adequately for the infant's needs then an optimal
situation exists.
The good-enough "mother" (not necessarily the infant's own
mother) is one who makes active adaptation to the infant's
needs, an active adaptation that gradually lessens, accord
ing to the infant's growing ability to account for failure
of adaptation and to tolerate the results of frustration
(p. 94).
It is of upmost importance that the mother's adaptations in the begin
ning are near perfect.

This provides the infant with the sense of

"magical control" and the experience of "omnipotence" over the breast.
This creates the illusion that the breast is actually part of the
infant.

The illusion of fusion with the breast and the concommitant

experience of omnipotent control over it provides the basic capacity
needed to transcend the space between subjective experience and exter
nal reality.

Winnicott expresses the relationship of the healthy use

of illusion as.
the mother's adaptation to the infant's needs, when good
enough, gives the infant the illusion that there is an
external reality that corresponds to the infant's own
capacity to create. In other words, there is an overlap
between what the mother supplies and what the infant might
conceive of. . . . The infant perceives the breast only in
so far as a breast could be created just there and then
Cp. 95).
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As the infant matures there is greater need to adhere to the reality
principle (i.e., awareness of the demands of the environment).

The

onset of such change in experience creates a sense of "disillusion
ment."

This is essentially a shift in what is "subjectively con

ceived" to what is "objectively perceived."

Transitional object

formation appears to be the manner in which the struggle between
inner and outer reality is dealt with.

It is the transitional

object that fills the area of experience once occupied by primary
illusion.

As Winnicott states,

The intermediate area to which I am referring is the area
that is allowed to the infant between primary creativity
and objective perception based on reality testing. The
transitional phenomena represent the early stages of the
use of illusion, without which there is no meaning for the
human being in the idea of a relationship with an object
that is perceived by others as external to that being (p. 95).
The transitional object thus provides the infant with an "unchallenged"
area of experience yet different than the experience of magical control
over the breast.

Winnicott emphasizes this distinction as, "the transi

tional object is not an internal object (which is a mental concept)—
it is a possession.

Yet it is not (for the infant) an external object

either" (p. 94).
This relates directly to the transitional objects existence as
a third area of experience, part "inner reality" and part "outerreality," part "me" and part "not-me."

Its distinction from an inter

nal (i.e., introjected) object is an important aspect, though its con
nection to the internal object is essential as well.
the nature of this relationship in the following:

Winnicott states
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The infant can employ a transitional object when the internal
object is alive and real and good enough (not too persecutory).
But this internal object depends for its qualities on the
existence and aliveness and behavior of the external object
(breast, mother figure, general environmental care). Badness
of failure of the latter indirectly leads to deadness or to a
persecutory quality of internal object. After a persistence
of failure of the external object, the internal object fails
to have meaning to the infant, and then, and then only, does
the transitional object become meaningless too. The transi
tional object may therefore stand for the "external" breast,
but indirectly, through standing for an "internal" breast
(p. 94).
The magnitude of Winnicott's formulations of transitional phe
nomena and transitional object extend beyond these aforementioned
aspects of early development.

The nature of transitional phenomena

throughout the life of the individual has been given special atten
tion by Winnicott.

Winnicott in essence helped place these phenomena

of early childhood in a theoretical framework which provides a greater
understanding of a broad range of human experience.

As Winnicott

states of the transitional object,
Its fate is to be gradually allowed to be decathected, so
that in the course of years it becomes not so much forgot
ten as relegated to limbo. By this I mean that in health
the transitional object does not "go inside," nor does the
feeling about it necessarily undergo repression. It is not
forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning and this
is because the transitional phenomena have become diffused,
have become spread out over the whole intermediate territory
between "inner psychic reality" and "the external world as
perceived by two persons in common," that is to say, over
the whole cultural field.
The extension of these phenomena, Winnicott further states,
widens out into play, and of artistic creativity and appre
ciation, and of religious feeling, and of dreaming, and also
fetishism, lying and stealing, the origin and loss of affec
tionate feeling, drug addiction, the talisman of obsessional
rituals, etc. (p. 91).
The developmental progression from the use of the transitional
object is into the area of play.

The child in play is, as in the
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transitional period, engaged in an area of experience between inner and
outer reality.

This theoretical conception of Winnicott's (1971) is

uniquely distinct in contrast to traditional psychoanalytic formulations
of play.

In more classical terms play was considered a manifestation of

sublimated instinctual drives (i.e., masturbatory activities).

Winnicott

rather directed attention to play as existing in a neutral area of inter
mediate experience or what he terms "potential space."

This space grows

out of the early mother-infant interaction where a sense of magical or
omnipotent control originates which is founded upon the "good-enough
mothering" experience.
originates.

It is within this early interaction that play

This is not to say instincts are not involved but rather

are secondary to something more important.

When they do become pro

nounced Winnicott feels play is interfered with.

The instincts, states

Winnicott, "are the main threat to play as to the ego" (p. 52).

Play

for the child is "satisfying" as were the early experiences with the
mother.

It evolves out of trust.

This capacity develops through the

good-enough mothering experiences and the knowledge that the loved per
son is reliable and consistent in the meeting of needs.

Winnicott refers

to these good early experiences as crucial in the development of "egorelatedness."

It is the culmination of these experiences that provide

the child with the ability to play.

It is the "preoccupation" of the

child engaged in play that amply demonstrates the intermediate area of
experience.

As Winnicott states:

"The content does not matter.

What

matters is the near withdrawal state, akin to concentration of older
children and adults.

The playing child inhabits an area that cannot

be easily left, nor can it easily admit intruders" (1971, p. 51).
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One further elaboration of this theme of the developmental
progression from the transitional object into the area of play will
be useful.

As has been mentioned earlier the creation of transitional

objects is founded upon the good-enough environmental experiences with
the concommitant illusion of omnipotent or magical control, which sub
sequently gives way to reality adaptations, differentiation, and the
progression from subjective to objective experience.

Inherent in the

early mother-infant interaction is the experience of total dependence
by the infant.

It is within this realm, when good-enough, that the

infant experiences what Winnicott refers to as a sense of "being."
This sense of being is essentially derived through the illusion of
fusion with the breast-object.

It is here that the infant and the

mother not only "feel at one" but "are one."

This early sense of

being is the foundation upon which one's later psychological cohe
siveness (i.e., identity) is formed.

For without this experience the

gratifications of life remain allusive, as does the sense of feeling
whole and connected with the world.

With this initial experience the

later capacity for "doing" can be established.

This sense of doing

reflects the ability to function and experience the world in a more
mature fashion.

This initiates a sense of object relating in the

area of objective experience, where one feels "real" and in tune with
reality.

These capacities of being and doing relate to the concept

of creativity as used by Winnicott.

This is not the creativity judged

by product but rather a "universal" process.

As Winnicott states, "It

belongs to being alive . .*. the approach of the individual to external
reality" (pp. 67-68).

It is the nature of this creative capacity in
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which transitional phenomena are formed, where the area of subjective
and objective reality meet and where life is experienced.
tial space develops:

This poten

first from the earliest subjective experiences;

to those founded in illusion; then into the transitional realm and the
use of transitional objects; into the area of play; later to the expe
rience of play with another individual; and finally into the cultural
experience in general.

The Fetish and Transitional Object
The use of inanimate objects from early infancy through adult
hood has initiated much controversy and confusion as to the actual
genesis and function of these objects.

Their formation and develop

ment in infancy and use through childhood has been considered normal
and healthy by some investigators, while others view such inanimate
object attachments to be signs of present as well as possible future
psychopathology in adulthood in the form of the fetish object.

This

section will attempt to evaluate the development of psychological
thought in this area with special emphasis upon differentiating the
features between the fetish, which applies to a narrow area of adult
perversion, predominantly in males, and the transitional object.

Aspects of the Adult
and Infantile Fetish
Although the fetish has been traditionally considered as an
aspect of adult psychopathology, it has been gaining greater atten
tion, within what is believed to be its precursor manifestations,
namely the infantile and childhood fetish.

Within the classical

framework of adult fetishism, the fetish was believed to develop
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during the oedipal period at the height of castration (i.e., fear of
bodily destruction) anxiety.

Some individuals have dealt with this

overwhelming panic by the creation of a symbolic maternal phallus
(i.e., unharmed powerful body part) in the form of a concrete object
as a defensive means of protecting themselves from this threat.
Freud (1927, 1959) has suggested that the actual sight of the penis
less mother is a necessary component of severe castration panic which
leads to the development of the fetish.

Wulff's (1946) consideration

of inanimate object attachments by the infant as fetishistic posed a
challenge to the previously accepted notions of the origins of the
adult fetish.

Wulff's dealings with individuals with infantile pre-

oedipal fetishes suggests that rather than the fetish representing a
maternal phallus it may be a symbolic representation of the breast.
Otherwise, it would have been necessary for the oral infant to have
observed the lack of a maternal penis and not only have had experi
enced a castration threat, but would have had to repress the threat
in the process of creating a symbolic maternal phallus.

Wulff's new

position of the inanimate or fetish object as being a substitute
object for the breast distinguishes infantile fetishes from adult
fetishes.

As Wulff states, "fetishistic manifestations in the young

child are not at all uncommon, but the psychological structure of
childhood fetishism, as of other psychological manifestations, is a
different one" (p. 465).

The nature of the childhood fetish there

fore, is of an oral instinctual type which may be due to vicisitudes
in weaning.

Wulff also relegates tactile and olfactory aspects to

the fetish object which may represent predominance of more "activistic"
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qualities of the nature of early experience and which become associated
to the substitute or fetish object of primary identification.

Views of Inanimate Object Usage
by Children as Fetishistic
Sperling (1963) a harsh critique of Winnicott's concept of
transitional objects, clearly states that, "Winnicott's concepts are
not only fallacious but dangerous because they lead to erroneous
assessment of the meaning and function of fetishistic childhood phe
nomena and childhood fetishism" (p. 377).

Sperling postulates sev

eral factors that contribute to the pathological nature of these early
object attachments, based upon her own clinical experience with appar
ent childhood fetish behavior.

Like Wulff, Sperling accepts the oral

nature of these attachments as the underpinnings of fetishistic mani
festations.

Such children displaying the fetish object reflect a

symbolic part-object (i.e., not fully differentiated as separate from
the self) breast attachment.

It is the later developmental maturation

of the child which exposes and superimposes anal and phallic attributes
upon the object.

The mother is believed to be a key figure in the for

mation of these childhood fetishes.

Sperling's analytic work appears

to suggest that it is often the mother's own unconscious motives and
conflicts that are being imposed on the child.

In this manner not

only is the mother responsible for the unconscious stimulation and
encouragement of such behavior, but is often instrumental in the
actual choice of the object (i.e., offering a substitute object in
lieu of herself).

Sperling states:

that the need for a fetish has something to do with the real
ity of the child's experiences. In the lives of these children
there has been real seduction and actual overstimulation of
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component instincts in the relationship with the parents,
especially with the mother (p. 381).
The development of the fetish is thus an external adaptation to the dis
torted instinctual drives.

In this manner frustrated instinctual drives

are placed onto the object and away from the frustrating mother and self
The fetishist's true detriment is in the disturbances in the internaliza
tion process inherent in normal superego development.

As Sperling

states, "There is incomplete introjection of parental images because of
persistance of part-object relationship and deflection of unmodified
sexual and aggressive impulses to the fetish" (pp. 381-382).

Sperling

apparently considers the fetish object a sign of disturbed object rela
tionships.

It develops through disturbances in early mother-infant

interaction where a fixation appears to occur to a part object (i.e.,
breast) in the form of a fetish object.

The development of the fetish

is suggested to be a result of a threat to the self founded upon an
apparent loss of magical or omnipotent control over the breast or part
object.

At this stage of development, which is at the height of pri

mary narcissism, loss of object is analagous to loss of self.

Such a

loss is in turn defended against by the creation of the fetish.
This narcissitic investment in an inanimate object may bear
some semblance to Kohut's (1971) theorizing of narcissistic personal
ity disorders.

Such individuals according to Kohut are fixated at a

primary state in which part object relations of an idealized nature
are evident, with the concommitant interference of normal superego
integration, very similar to Sperling's assertations.

The difference

in the development of the fetish in contrast to the developmental fix
ation of the narcissistic individual, when both are confronted with
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loss of object and thus loss of self, is in the defensive manuever to
adapt to the strain.

The individual creating the fetish has made an

external, more realistic adaptation, while the narcissistic individual
or neurotic individual as Sperling suggests, makes a more internal
adaptation expressed in "fantasy or symptoms."

Sperling's position

is clearly one that views the inanimate object attachments of the
infant and those inanimate attachments of the adult as existing on a
developmental continuum.

As she states, "The child's fetish and the

fetish of the adult appear to be different stages of the same process,
which may or may not lead to adult fetishism" (p. 391).
Dickes (1963) is also skeptical of Winnicott's assertions that
attachments to inanimate objects by the young child are healthy.

He

also tends to feel that these object attachments are of a fetishistic
nature.

Clearly he asserts that they represent the part-object of the

parents which is often of an anatomically sexual nature.

In the devel

opment of such fetishistic objects, Dickes believes that preoedipal
experiences (i.e., oral and anal) are involved.

He finds such mate

rial to be often related to later castration anxiety and the manifes
tation of the fetish object in adult life.

Dickes believes the dis

tinctions made between the infantile fetish, transitional object, and
adult fetish to be "artificial."

Although the complex of experience

that leads to the adult fetish is intricate, there are certain factors
that seem to be outstanding.

Much like Sperling's assumptions, Dickes

finds the role of the parents to be instrumental, often in their exhibitionistic and seductive behavior allowing such children ample oppor
tunity to view the anatomical features of their bodies, in their
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unconscious rejections and neurotic projections on to the child, as well
as in encouraging the use of inanimate objects in lieu of themselves.
The amalgamation of this overall process is summarized by Dickes:
The final fetish may be said to have a composite of meanings
covering the various developmental phases. The fetish even
tually comes to signify the parents as partial objects, that
is, the parents reduced to their sexual parts. This concept
is to be considered as amending Freud's remarks concerning
the fetish as representative of the female phallus. The role
of the parents in the production of fetishism cannot be over
looked. Exhibitionism and other sexual exploitations of the
child are commonplace. The parents are themselves often the
investigators of the fetish choice which serves the purpose
of circumventing the urgency and power of the drive interplay
between parent and child. The introduction and use of inani
mate objects can, under special circumstances, be harmful and
lead to the development of full-fledged fetishism (pp. 328-329).
Buxbaum's (1960) work with two young girls whose apparent hair
pulling behavior, she believed, suggests close relationship to Winnicott's conceptualization of transitional objects.

Evidently both girls

had preoedipal experiences of seeing the parents' genital areas.

The

trauma was compounded by one girl's experience of her mother's menstrual
bleeding while the other observed a genital injury to her father.

Bux-

baum marks the critical age for both these girls' experiences at eigh
teen months.

The important factor again was exhibitionistic behavior

by the parents of an often suggestive and seductive kind.

Although

neither child had a fetish object, they readily adopted them when they
were presented to them, in one case it was a stuffed poodle offered by
the therapist, in the other a woolly kitten by the mother.

Both objects

were engaged in a fetishistic manner, the letter of which was employed
repeatedly in masturbatory activity.

Through the process of uncovering

the underlying traumatic material, Buxbaum was able to eliminate the
hair pulling, which was an apparent identification with the genital
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areas of the parents and inability to separate from the primary object.
This behavior was interpreted as an attempt by the children "to fulfill
their need for tactile and skin sensations" (p. 259).

Subsequently,

the children were able to use their "intermediary" inanimate objects
to promote healthier object relationships and facilitate separation
from the previously fixated part-object mother.
The work of Greenacre (1953, 1955, 1960, 1968) provides some of
the more definitive considerations of the etiology of adult fetishism
in light of early developmental experiences.

Her late work (1969, 1970)

also provides some very useful insights into the similarities and differ
ences between the fetish object and transitional object.
It appears from Greenacre's clinical experience with adult fet
ishists that certain elements appear common as probable genetic (i.e.,
related to psychological development) factors.

Initially Greenacre

(1953) speculated that early mother-infant disturbances due to not goodenough mothering may create a flaw in the normal development of the
infant's developing body image.

This poorly developed sense of body

image formation may create a tendency or predisposition by the individ
ual for an overreaction in the oedipal-phallic period of exaggerated
castration anxiety.

Since such an individual is weakened in the realm

of body image formation the later castration anxiety is dealt with by
the creation of the fetish object to defend against this overwhelming
threat to self, and especially, threat to the genitals.

Thus, the

fetish is a means of supporting a weak genital body outline formation.
This is not to suggest that early disturbances in infancy will lead to
later fetish formation, but rather disturbances both in early infancy
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and in the phallic stage may interact for the possible likelihood of
emergence.

Greenacre's (1969) later conceptualizations placed empha

sis on two other factors which seem to promote the fetish creation.
These include consistent and ample opportunity of exposure to the ana
tomical differences between the sexes, and the experience of viewing
damage or injury to an important other (i.e., parent, or the infant
himself).

These visual experiences at critical times, during the sec

ond and fourth years, may cause disturbances in the formation of a
sound body image, particularly if the mothering experiences have been
inadequate.

It seems that the visual experience of these events with

the concommitant tactile nature of the body-image formation process
contribute to the external concrete nature of the fetish object.

In

a later attempt to reconcile the theoretical problems inherent in
relating early infantile disturbances with later oedipal castration
anxiety, Greenacre (1970) states the following:
It is my impression that early fetish formation does not
develop unless the accompanying disturbances have been so
undermining as to produce a severe preoedipal castration
problem, whether through illness, operative procedure, or
severe parental mishandling. It is significant that at
the early age of one to two years there is a general body
responsiveness to discomfort of physical insult, and dis
charge of tension may occur through whatever channels are
available at this special time. If the disturbance is so
severe however, that ordinary discharge mechanisms are
inadequate, premature genital stimulation may be induced.
This is most likely to occur during the second year. This
tends then to promote sadomasochistic elements in the incip
ient erotic response. Some fluidity between pre-genital
responses remains, and gives rise to persistent polymorphous
perverse reactions as well as increasing later castration
problems (pp. 447-448).
Roiphe (1968) and Roiphe and Galenson (1973) have further empha
sized that early preoedipal castration anxiety is an important factor in
the genesis of fetish formation.

These authors feel that a normal
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preoedipal phallic activation is often evidenced during the second half
of the second year of life.

This early phallic arousal is consistent

with the more traditional notions of the oedipal-phallic nature of the
fetish.

In addition they find that the opportunity to witness the ana

tomical differences between the sexes is an accompanying factor to the
preoedipal sexual arousal.

A final feature involved is either a direct

physical injury to the infant or mother, or general experience of an
inadequate or not good-enough mothering situation, resulting in an
"instability of the self and object representation" (p. 155).

Case

material based upon clinical observation of children seems to support
the notion that the interaction of these factors can contribute to the
emergence of an infantile fetish object (1973).

Roiphe and Galenson

(1975) in another case study were able to observe the adaptive and
plastic nature of a transitional object for a young girl dealing with
an apparent preoedipal castration problem induced through exposure to
the anatomical sexual differences of her parents.

When this was com

pounded by an actual separation from her parents producing a severe
separation trauma, the transitional object appeared to become inade
quate and was replaced by a fetish object with more rigid adaptive
value.

It was also the target of aggression and served as a repara

tive patch.

Differentiating Between the Fetish
Object and Transitional Object
The distinguishing features between Winnicott's concept of
transitional object and the apparent pathological nature of the fetish
object have been delineated in certain respects, though both are
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Inanimate objects used to make certain adaptations in an illusory type
way.

Greenacre (1969) has viewed the transitional object and the fetish

object in different lights.

The most obvious and maybe the most impor

tant distinction is that the transitional object serves a function in
infancy while the fetish, in the traditional sense, does not appear
before adolescence or adulthood.

Though she sees this as an important

difference, it is believed the fetish has its origins in early life due
to various disturbances.

On the other hand the transitional object

which also has its roots in infancy is believed to be universal and
healthy.

Consideration of more intrapsychic factors may make these

distinctions clear.
The transitional object, usually adopted by the infant in the
first year, is a symbolic creation of an area of experience between
mother and infant, in which the breast-object is markedly important.
In contrast the fetish object signifies a genital association between
infant and mother, founded apparently upon a disturbance in early
object relations compounded by later castration panic.

Therefore,

though both originate in early life, their functions and purposes are
extremely different.

The illusory or magical component of those two

types of inanimate object attachments are strikingly different as well.
The illusion and magic inherent in the fetish formation, appears to be
more complex than that of the transitional object.

As Greenacre states,

This is a much more complicated magical procedure, related
to fascination and self-hypnosis, than is true in the owner
of the transitional object. It combines magical materiali
zation and obliteration, a figurative bringing to life or
killing, and it very much influences tumescence and detume
scence (p. 162).
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While the transitional object is founded upon illusion as well,
it gradually gives way and helps bridge one's experience in a reality
oriented fashion.

Though it eventually loses its importance it expands

and takes on form in other areas of experience.

In this manner the

transitional object is plastic and maleable as it provides a buffer
zone in the child's growing experience of disillusionment and adapta
tions to reality.

The fetish on the other hand is more concrete and

narrow in its function, as it serves as a symbolic maternal phallus.
Though its function is limited the fantasy aligned with it can be
elaborate indeed.
Greenacre also contrasts the differential manifestations of
aggression involved in fetish use as opposed to transitional object
use.

The transitional object which is born out of an early era of

infancy is not ladened with introjected aggression.

The transitional

object depends on the illusion of omnipotence and good-enough mother
ing.

Rarely is the transitional object attacked with vicious hostil

ity and aggressive impulses.

The fetish, quite contrary to the transi

tional object, abounds with repressed hostility, founded on the experi
ence of severe castration panic.

Accompanying the need for the fetish

object in the sexual act is the not uncommon pervasiveness of sadomaso
chistic tendencies.

Greenacre concludes with an appropriate summation,

In closing I would emphasize that the transitional object is
a temporary construction to aid the infant in the early
stages of developing a sense of reality and establishing his
own individual identity. It is of positive value in monitor
ing growth and expansion. It is dispensed with, when it is
no longer needed. In contrast, the fetish serves as a patch
for a flaw in the genital area of the body image. While
necessary for the approximation of an adequate sexual func
tion, it is not otherwise useful. Like many patches it is
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circumscribed, aims to be durable, but is not always success
ful. In that case it must be renewed, sometimes with even
larger patches (p. 163).
Although these distinctions are significant, some attempt need
to be made to resolve the various ways in which the previous investi
gators have referred to what is considered a fetish object or transi
tional object.

Bak (1974) feels that much of what has been referred

to as infantile fetishes and childhood fetishes does little to differ
entiate the pathological nature of inanimate object usage from the
normal aspects of growth inherent in the transitional object.

This

is evidenced in the narrow way some authors (Sperling 1963, Dickes
1963) relegate any usage of an inanimate object to the realm of fet
ishism leaving no room for its normal and healthy usage.

Bak asserts,

based on clinical consideration of the linkage of the fetish to the
maternal phallus, that its genesis must be founded upon a "phasespecific" developmental sequence arising in the phallic-oedipal per
iod.

Early attachments to objects in the first year of life is incom

patible with a fetish explanation, particularly of the phallic sort.
Early object attachments that are apparently pathological may suggest
a fetish of an oral nature rather than the phallic nature of the adult
fetish or even the childhood fetish of later years.

The infantile oral

fetish founded in the not good-enough mothering situation of overfrus
tration and overstimulation with the concommitant encouragement of an
object by the mother in lieu of herself, may represent a quite differ
ent genetic component, related to vicissitudes in weaning (Greenacre
1970).
Bak (1974) has also pointed out, as has Greenacre (1970) that
the examples Dickes and Sperling have offered in their arguments for

21

the fetishlstic nature of inanimate object attachments were far from
typical examples of the ubiquitous transitional object.

These objects

were often imposed from the outside on the infant and not developed and
relegated to special importance by the infant’s own creative process.
This also seems to be the case with Buxbaum's (1960) attempt to relate
"intermediary objects," those given by the parent or therapist, to the
transitional object.

Some of Wulff's (1946) examples seem to be sub

ject of similar criticism.
Dickes (1978) has somewhat reconciled his differences with
Winnicott's concept of transitional object and his ox«i early consid
erations of the fetish as he now allows room for normal object usage.
His main objection appears to be to Winnicott’s position that the true
transitional object even surpasses the mother in importance.
extreme attachments he finds pathological and fetishistic.

Such
The transi

tional object, he believes, should be reserved for those children who
use the object in a moderate way, when confronted with separation or
anxiety for instance, but do not place its importance above the mother.
It is apparent though, that the large number of children with
so called fetishes reflects an inconsistency with the small number of
adult fetishists (A. Freud 1965).

It seems most plausible that two

separate processes are in operation.

Theoretical Considerations
Winnicott's formulations of transitional objects and transi
tional phenomena serve as the basis for all subsequent speculations
about this fascinating "third area" of life.

His ability to delineate

this area of experience demonstrated a keenness for discovering

22

psychological importance in a ubiquitous childhood activity.

As

Stevenson (1954) stated, "the commonplace and the everyday has once
again proved exciting in its implications.

The diversity and richness

of individual experience, which yet comes within the terms of 'normal
ity' can never fail to challenge the student of psychology" (p. 216).
Though much has been written and speculated about the nature of the
transitional object since Winnicott's (1953) original publication,
nearly all is an extention of his basic postulates.

Here attention

will be directed toward a greater understanding of the origins, devel
opment, and function of the transitional object in the normal develop
mental sequence as well as the nature of its fate for the individual.
Winnicott's conceptions of the mother-infant interaction pro
vided room within psychoanalytic theory for the consideration of normal
and healthy modes of functioning.

It is the transitional modes of

experience which appear to incorporate that area in which the world is
experienced with active vigor and a sense of wholeness.

The roots of

this developmental sequence, Winnicott (1971) suggests, arise out of
the mothering experience, not as a means of forced adaptation to real
ity, but rather as a fulfilling encounter with the real world.

The

mother is not viewed as merely the provider of need deficits and
instinctual desires, but also as a provider of contact and creative
"primary illusion" which forms the basis for transitional experience.
This foundation is based upon experience with the "holding mother" or
"environmental mother" as Winnicott so aptly termed it.
Kestenberg (1978) and Kestenberg and Weinstein (1978) have
focused upon the neurophysiological underpinnings of the holding
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experience (i.e., the earliest mother-infant interactions of contact)
and the psychological aspects of this early contact as it is related
to body image formation and the origin and development of transitional
objects.
Kestenberg (1978) has proposed a relationship between the acti
vation of the Gamma Nervous System (GNS) which functions through the
body meridians (similar to Chinese accupuncture lines) to serve as the
psychophysiological basis of the formation of the body image and the
later interactions with the transitional object.

More specifically,

the GNS is that part of the nervous system related to subcortical
functions dominantly expressed in the earliest tactile experiences of
life.

The holding environment activates the system through the body

meridians and provides the infant with his earliest psychophysiologi
cal experiences.

The GNS is set in motion by the stretching and breath

ing of the organism or what is referred to as "outgoingness."

This

movement outward when experienced positively, provides a sense of trust,
free of anxiety, and is related to the sense of movement into the envi
ronment in vital active form.

This positive environmental state or

"eutony" is achieved through outgoingness or what is referred to as
"transsensus."

The state of transsensus is a state of being whole and

connected, a viable part of the holding environment, which provides the
rudiments of a durable body image formation.

This state of "transsensus

outgoingness" is initiated prenatally, further activated through birth
and later still in the holding environment.

The acquisition of a transi

tional object can be viewed as a further part of this developmental
sequence.
following:

Kestenberg adroitly expresses this relationship in the
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Holding the transitional object, and imagining that it holds him,
stroking it and making it stroke his face while sucking, are
all conducive to the maintenance of a special state of conscious
ness, which is at the borderland between internal and external
reality. The soothing rhythms of the sucking dull the sharp
intrusion of reality, while the transsensus, based on being held
and touched as well as on holding and touching, prevents the
engulfment of the "nothingness" of sleep. The play action with
the transitional object is the external manifestation of related
ness, the basic core of fantasy that weaves illusion into every
day life (p. 71).
The physiological base for this type of creativity in the inter
mediate zone between mother and child is the activation of the
GNS, which, through its hypothalmic connection, regulates the
hormonal, stimulating-dulling, and waking-sleep centers, as well
as all other rhythemic regulators of bodily needs. Through its
connections via the hypothalamus to the cortex, the comfort giv
ing, body-image building creativity becomes transformed into
play and art— the individual's gift to society. Transsensus,
the ideomotor, affective component of body-image building,
remains the core of all relationships. Transitional phenomena,
the beloved possessions, allow the individual to dilute the
intensity of his feelings for his love object and to make the
rhythm of loss and retrieval of the object, the principle ingre
dient of the uniquely human achievement- creativity based on
sameness and leading to change (p. 71).
Kestenberg and Weinstein (1978) further explored the nature of
body-image formation and transitional object development as developmen
tal products of the non-nutritive aspects of the "holding environment."
These experiences of being part of and secure in one's world while
actively engaging it flow from the fulfilling experiences of trans
sensus.

This activity is derived through holding and touching provides

the illusion of the soothing qualities of mother infant contact.

These

rhythmic activities structure a sound body image and provide the founda
tion for the recapitulation of this state in play with the transitional
object as it serves to restore the sense of wholeness and soothing of
the intermediate zone between mother and infant.

The transitional

object is experienced as part of the infant, as comforting, and thus
providing the illusion of the recreation of the mother as well as
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narcissistic creation of the self.

This creative activity, though

founded in being alone (i.e., the mother's absence), is soon experi
enced as fulfillment and wholeness.

As Kestenberg and Weinstein state,

"The yearning for reunion is overcome by illusions, fantasies, and body
memories, all related to the first formation of psychic content (transsensus) in the intermediate area, which bridges the gap between inter
nal and external reality" (p. 90).
Deri (1978) extends the importance of the earliest tactile
experiences which are involved in the development of the body-image
and the delineation of the surface between inner and outer reality,
to the symbolization process which functions as a means to transcend
this boundary.

The experience of good tactile sensations induces in

the infant good feelings within one's boundaries and correspondingly
outside as well.

The mediation of this experience between inner and

outer reality is, according to Deri, communication in its most rudi
mentary form and hence a symbolization process.

Deri further suggests

that the area of experience which develops from the earliest tactile
experiences may be thought of as the "predecessor of the 'mind,' which
corresponds more or less to what is called the preconscious, the store
house of symbolic internal representations" (p. 56).
object also serves a function in this framework.

The transitional

Its use represents a

symbolic creative process by the infant but are important in the devel
opment of higher symbolic activity.

This occurs as the transitional

object itself, begins to lose importance for the child.

Its creative

function survives though, and is expanded as its symbolic qualities
become integrated into the preconscious.

Its internalization is thus

a kind of "fertilizer" for the development of further symbolic growth.
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An important aspect of consideration in fully understanding the
function of the transitional object is its role in the development of
the infant's cognitive as well as psychological growth.

Its onset of

appearance within the first year of life, seems to indicate the presence
of basic cognitive and memory skills.

Also occurring within the first

year, at a very similar time, is the appearance of separation anxiety in
the infant.

The nature of such manifestations appears to imply indica

tions of object constancy.

Various authors though, as reviewed by

Fraiberg (1969), attribute object constancy to quite different periods
ranging from 6 to 24 months.

The discrepancy appears to be in the

actual definition of what constitutes object constancy.

Fraiberg has

suggested that this discrepancy is due to the lack of delineation
between libidinal object constancy and cognitive object constancy.

The

libidinal tie that is established by the infant to the mother is believed
to occur within the first year of life.

It is the notion of cognitive

object constancy which requires higher mental representational capacities,
allowing the infant to produce the mother's image in her absence, that
develops at a later period (i.e., the second half of the second year).
Fraiberg has proposed a distinction between "recognition" and "evocative"
aspects of memory to help clarify this issue.

Although the infant can

not evoke the image of the external stimulus within the first year, the
capacity to recognize it in the presence of the object is still possible.
Thus, the separation anxiety experienced at approximately 6-8 months may
be a response reflecting the lack of recognition of unknown or unfamiliar
objects which fail to restimulate memory traces that have been highly
cathected (i.e., the mother's face).

The evocation of highly cathected
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images in the absence of the loved object during the second year repre
sents a different process.

The latter experience would be more highly

developed where self and other are more clearly differentiated.

This

response may be more closely related to the aspects of separation
experienced during rapprochement as defined by Mahler (1972).
Metcalf and Spitz (1978) view the transitional object as a
critical component in the development from recognition memory to evo
cative memory.

The authors suggest that the development of transi

tional objects of transitional phenomena from the onset of recognition
memory at about 6 months to the establishment of evocative memory at
approximately 24 months represents an actual stage in development.
The function served by the transitional object is essentially one
that helps evoke the mother's image with its concommitant pleasant
memory traces and sense of security in her absence.
object is described as a "quasi-evocative stimulus."

The transitional
The transitional

object is basically experienced by the infant as a substitute libidinal
object, a structure which soothes and is reassuring and protective.
The development and function of the transitional object is stated
clearly in the following:
Accordingly, it is to be expected that the transitional object
will arise at a state at which the constitution of the libidinal
object proper is not yet complete. The transitional object will
carry even over into the often tempestuous vicissitudes of
object relations the climate of that golden age in which the
unambivialant signal, "need gratification," represented the
relief of need tension. We therefore feel justified in postu
lating the establishment of the transitional object as a spe
cific stage in the progress from recognition of a sign gestalt
to evocation through a volitional act of mentation.
It is a
stage in the natural history of object development (p. 105).
The resultant development of the transitional object has been
suggested by Metcalf and Spitz to culminate in two differing directions.
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With the onset of evocation the transitional object may be disregarded
by the child.

Retaining it though, at this time, signifies a change

in its functions which is believed to "lead to the highest levels of
imaginative objectification" (p. 106).
The eventual fate of the transitional object has been one
aspect of its overall manifestation that has been subject to great
debate.

Winnicott (1953) originally proposed that is does not "go

inside" but is eventually "decathected" and "relegated to limbo."
Many authors have taken exception to that explanation, most notably
Tolpin (1971).

According to Tolpin the self-regulatory soothing

functions of the transitional object do eventually "go inside" and
become internalized as psychic structure.

It was her application

of Kohut's (1971) concept of "transmuting internalization" that has
represented the most significant modification of Winnicott's theori
zation of transitional objects.

Kohut's concept of transmuting inter

nalization reflects the process in which narcissistically invested
object cathexes gradually become internalized as psychic structure.
This occurs through small "optimal" frustrating experiences in which
previously experienced illusions of omnipotence and total security
fade and become less frequent.

These soothing narcissistic qualities

are first reestablished through the soothing qualities of transitional
experiences which can revoke the symbiotic fusion.

Later the transi

tional objects themselves are internalized through the same process,
as reality adaptation develops through separation-individuation.
Thus, the function of the transitional object is to provide a "transi
tional form of mental structure" (Tolpin 1971, p. 327).

Later the

more mature ego can provide the needed soothing itself, without the
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aid of the transitional object, while further allowing more mature men
tal structure to develop.

As Tolpin states, "it is the cathexis, opti

mal loss, and internalization of supporting mental functions which
build the ego during infancy" (p. 331).

The Creative Element
Though much has been discussed about the importance of the tran
sitional stage of development within the realm of normal and psychologi
cal growth for the very young child, its impact ranges far beyond those
aspects related to infancy and early childhood.
The illusion of having created one's special possession provides
the young child with a positive means of negotiating inner and outer
reality.

This illusion serves as a bridge between the growing sense of

self and the external world.

The gradual diminuation of importance of

the transitional object allows it to take on new properties as that
area of inner and outer experience is explored in play and throughout
the entire "cultural field" (Winnicott 1953).

It is this conceptuali

zation of the transitional object that emphasizes its importance in
creative activity.
Rose (1978) views the transitional object as "an early, con
crete manifestation of the transitional process" (p. 352).

It is the

transitional process which reflects the creative interactional capac
ities employed to interweave the inside and outside worlds.

Rose

expresses this transitional process in the following:
As in its early form as the transitional object, the transi
tional process in its developed form as the creative imagin
ation remains an essential instrument of adaptation. It
samples the pluralism of reality, withdraws and readvances,
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attempting to abstract coherent configurations composed of
self and non-self elements. They bridge the out-there with
the in-here in new ideas and images. In contrast to repres
sion and denial, these abstractions offer new perspectives
from which to explore and enhance rather than circumscribe
the appreciation of reality (p. 354).
The transitional process is thus not limited to only early
childhood, but involves creative interaction with the world.

One's

adaptations take on a creative flavor as this process permeates one’s
experiential field.
The notion of creative living should not be confused with the
production of what are considered "artistic" or "creative" works.
emphasis here is on "process" and not "products" (Beres 1960).

The

This

envelopes one's creative imagination and spontaneity, as well as a
sense of being and participating in everyday life.

It does not elim

inate though, creativity that culminates in a product of one's expres
sion.
Dinnage (1978) emphasizes the early symbolic activity, as
described by Winnicott in transitional objects and transitional phe
nomena, as a needed reformulation of old psychoanalytic notions of
creativity.

Rather than viewing creativity as the sublimation of

instinctual desires, with its negative connotations, creativity is
placed within a perspective of positive enjoyment through spontaneous
activity.

It is truly a satisfying experience with the world.

The

"illusion" of the creative act need not be restricted by the negative
implications of illusion as the absence of reality.

From a Winnicot-

tian viewpoint "illusion" takes on new meaning, one based on trust and
confirmation of one's existence and being in the world.

The illusion

gradually gives way to greater reality testing, but the sense of having
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"made" one's world remains in a still viable form which becomes expressed
in creative play and later throughout one's mediation with the cultural
environment.

As Dinnage suggests:

"The key to making things, then, is

concurrence, when what the child expects and what the world offers inter
sects, the object is both found and created at the same moment" (p. 370).
When this illusion fails to form there exists, "the opposite of concur
rence, of the cooperation between outside 'thereness' and inner expecta
tion, is the sense of total unrecognizability, entire strangeness, which
is nightmare and madness" (p. 371).

Clinical Applications of the Transitional Object
Winnicott's concept of the transitional object has provided a new
and valuable way of understanding childhood development particularly in
relation to the separation-individuation process.

Its clinical applica

tions to individuals having experienced difficulties during this period
allows unique insights into their level of psychic functioning.

This is

evident in early childhood psychopathology as well as in the psycho
pathology of the adult.

In addition, it provides the clinician with a

framework in which to deal with these problems.

This is apparent when

one tries to understand the level of object relations of such individuals.
The usefulness of Winnicott's formulations become especially
critical when attempting to deal with individuals with severe characterological disturbances as seen in many borderline and psychotic patients.
Here the focus is upon structural defects that interfere with normal
psychological development and the attainment of higher ego integration.
Furer (1964) related the "psychotic fetish" of a symbiotic psy
chotic boy to aspects of Winnicott's transitional object.

Here the
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inanimate object was imbued with aspects of the self but only for short
periods of time.

The psychotic state seemed to shift to a transitional

level of functioning and back again to an autistic state of withdrawal.
Furer was able by consistently meeting the needs of the child to pro
gress him from his symbiotic state into a transitional level of func
tioning and beyond.

This was seen in his preoccupation with his feces,

which represented the boy's ability to differentiate objects from him
self, at least partially.

His feces appeared to take on qualities of

a transitional object.
Fintzy (1971), in his treatment of a borderline child, sug
gested apparent fixation at the level of transitional object develop
ment.

Indicative of childhood borderline states, he believes, is the

prolonged use of the object as well as the ready ability of other
inanimate objects to take its place.

The transitional object became

a focal point of the therapeutic situation in an effort to extend
separation beyond this level.
Another instance of the fixation at the transitional object
stage was described in a somewhat more unusual case of a selfmutilating teenage girl (Kafka 1969).
her body as some part not-me object.

The patient seemingly treated
Cutting her body and feeling

the soothing of the warm blood was actually described by this girl
in similar terms as transitional objects are often referred.

In this

particular case an early skin disease in infancy and the lack of tac
tile contact allowed this girl, Kafka suggests, may have libdinalized
the skin surface and lead to its fixation as a kind of transitional
obj ect.
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Modell (1963) related the transitional level of object rela
tions to both the adult borderline conditions and to schizophrenia.
The major difference between these disturbances may be due to some
biological factor involved in schizophrenia.

In schizophrenia this

biological factor may combine with a failure of normal psychological
structure to develop, to produce a deficit in development beyond the
transitional level and may create the subsequent withdrawal from the
world of reality in times of stress.

The psychological structure of

the borderline individual is similar, as it only appears to be of a
transitional level but does not disintegrate, at times, to extreme
withdrawal states as seen in the schizophrenic.

It should be noted

that in both of these conditions the level of object relations is
never an all or none affair.
Kahne (1967) related 3 cases of borderline individuals to vari
ous vicissitudes in early object relations, particularly those of the
transitional object stage.

The manner in which these patients used

inanimate objects in times of stress and threat in the analytic set
ting suggested such an etiology.

The use of these objects, Kahne

believes, reflects a primitive attempt by the ego to deal with prob
lems inherent in the separation process.
Coppolillo (1967) in a clinical study found disturbances in a
patient's ability to engage in this third area of experience as a
result of an imposing mother who interfered with normal transitional
object usage in her son's development.

By not allowing the child to

experience this area of life deficits were incurred in adulthood in
what might be considered the normal extention of the transitional
area, or ongoing transitional process.
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Kaminer (1978) also described a clinical case in which the
patient's mother directly interfered into the activities and experi
ences of her daughter in the transitional realm.

By imposing herself,

rather than allowing the patient to experience this area, the mother
disrupted the normal separation-individuation process.

This inter

rupted the normal internalization of soothing functions into psychic
structure.

Kaminer suggests such an outcome reduces an individual's

frustration tolerance in later life.
Volkan (1973), in the analysis of a narcissistic patient found
various fantasy material presented to be related to Winnicott's con
cept of the transitional object.

These fantasies were used similarly

as a child would use and manipulate his transitional object.

The

transitional fantasies provided the patient with a means of prevent
ing the regression to a total fusion or symbiotic state.
inner and outer reality could be mediated.

With them,

Working through the needed

use of these transitional fantasies was a key part of the analysis.
In the analytic treatment of 3 males with narcissistic charac
teristics and homosexual tendencies, Natterson (1976) found these
patients viewed themselves as their own transitional objects.

They

frequently saw themselves as "dolls" in a manner that strongly resem
bled one's interaction with a transitional object.

It seems that these

patients had to provide their own narcissistically soothing cathexes in
the form of their own bodies.

In addition to the doll fantasies of

themselves they had an inordinate preoccupation with clothing them
selves and decorating their surroundings.

The analyses focused upon

pregenital fixations and the use of their own bodies as transitional
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objects.

In each case fixation seemed to have occurred at the symbiotic

stage with the mother.

By never separating from the mother strong femi

nine identifications were produced.
Volkan and Kavanaugh (1978) in their clinical work also view
the borderline patient as functioning at the object relations stage
fluctuating between transitional experience and symbiosis.

The analy

tic focus upon these early separation foxations they found, reactivated
the use of transitional objects.

In these cases it was in the form of

attachments to cats.
Giovacchini (1978) also views transitional experiences as criti
cal for the psychic growth of borderline and psychotic individuals.

The

development of primary psychic creativity, which is founded in optimal
mothering experiences, is only minimally developed in these individuals.
The delusional states these persons show, he suggests, are used to avoid
early trauma states that have interrupted the normal developmental
sequence.
Parrish (1978) describes a case in which one twin uses the
other as a transitional object, but not quite at the immature level
seen in more borderline states.

Parrish has hypothesized that this

transitional relationship was of a secondary type as distinguished by
Busch, Nagera, McKnight and Pezzarossi (1973).
Solomon (1962) has related the fixed ideas of the obsessive
compulsive individual to a kind of "internalized transitional object."
Just as the transitional object provides mediation of the separationindividuation process, the fixed idea becomes a way of retaining the
link to the mother.

The fixed idea is pathological though, as it is
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a means of splitting aspects of the non-gratifying mother to provide
safety to the self.

These thoughts are founded upon conflict and

threat and must be preserved in a fixed form to protect the budding
ego.

The fixed idea is thus a way in which consistency can be met

when it has been lacking.
These previously mentioned studies all suggest the transitional
object level of object relations of severely disturbed individuals.
Other reports have looked at the transitional nature of the therapeutic
interaction as well as the analytic setting.
Searles (1975) suggested that the symptoms themselves of
severely disturbed individuals to be transitional in nature as they
are means of negotiating one's inner and outer reality.

He also

feels that the symptoms become transitional objects for the therapist
as they interact and influence the manner the patient is dealt with.
Other clinicians have viewed the therapeutic situation as
analogous to transitional experience.

Greenbaum (1978) characterized

the interaction between the analyst and patient, when ideal and work
ing, as akin to the experience with the transitional object.

The

therapist and patient come together and interact in an inbetween area
of experience.

This occurs as the therapist becomes the transitional

object for the patient as his sensitivity meets, almost magically, the
needs and concerns of the patient.
Greenson (1978) describes further clinical material in which
patients use the analytic setting as a transference transitional
object.

It seems that the analyst and the room provide certain sooth

ing functions which initiate a transference state of previous transi
tional experience.
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In another interesting report Grolnick (1978) attempts to link
the dream to aspects of transitional phenomena.

It appears to him that

the dream "is a refueling with representations first of the original
fusions with the part-object breast, then of the mother, and finally
of transitional objects; that is, regression in the dream occurs at all
available developmental levels" (p. 219).

It Is the transitional object

stage that Grolnick suggests may be a significant "resting place."
Understanding of dreams, at times, as transitional experiences can
allow the dream material to be dealt with more insightfully in therapy.
This was evident in Grolnick's patient as dreams were used defensively
and in a transitional manner to deal with the threatening nature of the
analytic setting.
It is apparent that the clinical applicability of the transi
tional object concept is theoretically as well as practically useful
for the clinician.

The preeence of such phenomena among borderline

and psychotic patients points to the importance of the normal progres
sion of transitional experience for healthy psychological functioning.
In addition, disruptions and fixations in its normal development prove
devastating for the psychological well being and growth of the individ
ual.
Empirical Findings
Although a great deal has been written about the transitional
object and transitional phenomena, most has been of the theoretical
and speculative domain with little in the way of true empirical inves
tigation.

Most of this research in turn has been limited to descrip

tive assessments of transitional objects.

This in part is due to the
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rather diverse and multitudinous manifestations of transitional phe
nomena making such investigation difficult.

Winnicott also pointed

out that by focusing upon concrete examples of such phenomena, such
as the blanket and teddy bear, that one might lose sight of the more
encompassing aspect of this human area of experience.

Often there

may be no readily apparent existence of the employment of a transi
tional object by the child.

As suggested by Winnicott, the "sequence

may nevertheless be broken or maintained in a hidden way" (p. 91).
Winnicott also felt that at times the mother herself could function
as a transitional object.

One essential feature that Winnicott did

feel to be inherent in a true transitional object is that it be, at
times, "more important than the mother" (p. 92).

This acknowledges

that the attachment to the object may be more significant to the
child in times of stress than the mother.

Its function is thus one

that is "soothing" and not merely a "comfort" to the infant or young
child.
Stevenson (1954) was the first to systematically assess some
of the dimensions of attachments formed to special objects by young
children.

Based upon survey data collected from mothers' clubs from

various parts of England she was able to distinguish several findings.
The data assessed various features of the transitional object, the
families' attitudes toward them, as well as background and history of
the children's functioning and development.

First, no sex differences

were found or apparent personality differences among the children with
transitional objects.

Also a distinction was made between "primary"

objects, the first possession formed during infancy and "secondary"
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object attachments at about 2-3 years of age with the first considered
the transitional object or "first not me possession" as referred by
Winnicott.

While the latter may not be the true transitional object

it is believed to be a further step toward the development of mature
object relationships.
Later investigations (Gaddini 1970; Ekecrantz and Rudhe 1972;
Busch et al. 1973; Rudhe and Ekecrantz 1974; Busch 1974; and Hong and
Townes 1976) provide some of the most complete assessments of transi
tional phenomena in the psychoanalytic literature.

(Also see review

by Hong 1978).
Gaddini (1970) compared three different social groups in Italy,
in relation to the formation of a transitional object.

The groups con

sisted of a rural group living outside of Rome, a group in the city
itself, and a group composed of foreign children living in Rome of
Anglo-Saxon background.

The findings showed significant differences

among the groups in terms of the actual attachments by the children
to transitional objects.

While 61.5% of the foreign group showed such

attachments, only 31.1% of those in the Rome group and 4.9% of the
rural group displayed an attachment.

The progression to a transitional

object appeared negatively correlated with breast feeding, duration of
breast feeding, sleeping in parents' bed or room, precursor's (fingers),
and being rocked.

Self rocking on the other hand was somewhat corre

lated with the use of a transitional object.
Busch et al. (1973) focused upon attachments infants form dur
ing the first year of life or what they refer to as primary transitional
objects.

Based upon observations and interviews these authors found

67.5% of the children to have transitional objects.

These attachments
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were evaluated based upon strict criteria as to what constitutes a
transitional object.

These include such things as:

its presence

during the first year of life; its use for a somewhat lasting dura
tion (1 year or longer); its "soothing" quality; its distinction
from an object of primary oral need gratification; its discovery by
the child and not imposed by the parents; and its distinction from
the infant's use of parts of its own body for comfort.

A factor

apparently found to be very important of the transitional object is
its tactile qualities.

This seems quite consonant with the features

surrounding Gaddini's (1970) investigation of the transitional object.
Busch et al. have also found that these early attachments appear to be
persistent with only 10% of the children between 2-5 apparently giving
up their object.
Ekecrantz and Rudhe (1972) assessed the dimensions of transi
tional phenomena, which they defined as "anything-behavior or objectthat habitually comforts the child" (p. 263), in areas focusing upon
incidence, various forms of the phenomena as well as the functions
they serve.

From their data based upon interviews of mothers with

three children (age groups from 1% -16 years), their results indi
cated that 74% of the children used or previously used something con
sidered to be a transitional phenomena (83.2% before age of one year).
The emotional atmosphere between mother and child appeared to be sig
nificantly related to the occurrence of transitional phenomena.

More

specifically, the more positive the relationship was evaluated the
greater the likelihood of the use by the child of transitional phe
nomena.

It was also found the transitional phenomena onset appears
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to be related to the time of weaning.

The authors also attempted to

relate variables of ego status, and development such as independency,
frustration tolerance and cultural and artistic interests, with transi
tional phenomena occurrence and duration.

No differences were found

though.
In a later study by Rudhe and Ekecrantz (1974) in which they
refined their definition of transitional phenomena, eliminating move
ments directed by the child to his or her own body, they found 59.7%
of the children to have transitional phenomena.

In addition 73%

exhibited these phenomena before 1 year of age.

Of all the children

with transitional phenomena 21.7% displayed multiple transitional phe
nomena.

The authors also found that at 6 years of age half the chil

dren with earlier transitional phenomena still displayed them.
Hong and Townes (1976) in a cross cultural study of infants'
attachments to transitional objects found findings similar to those
of Gaddini (1970).

Three groups were evaluated:

these were American

children, Korean children reared in America, and Korean children
reared in Korea.

The incidence of apparent transitional object

attachments were revealed to be 53.9% for the American children, 34%
for the Korean children in America and 18.3% for the Korean children
in Korea.

Factors contributing to these differences have been attrib

uted to differences in child rearing practices.

These are particularly

divergent in terms of the activities involving the mother and infant at
bedtime, such as sleeping arrangements, breast feeding and motherinfant contact and care.

Korean children raised in Korea more often

slept with the mother, nursed themselveB to sleep and had greater
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opportunity to be in contact with the mother physically.

These factors

were less prevalent in the Korean children in America and even markedly
less so in the American group.
One clinically related empirical study (Horton, Louy, and
Coppolillo 1974) compared the ability of individuals with personality
disorders to experience within the transitional realm with the ability
of control subjects to do so.

This capacity to experience "transitional

relatedness" was essentially absent in those persons with personality
disorders while the comparison group demonstrated this ability in 93%
of the cases.

Assessment of transitional relatedness was done through

interviews focusing upon both the presence of transitional objects in
early childhood and the ability in the present to use "soothing illu
sion" in, for example, in one's interactions with their family, reli
gion, and work.

The results also indicated a lack of transitional

objects in the early life of those individuals with personality dis
orders (83% gave no indication of such an attachment).
Some experimental studies, often overlooked in the psycho
analytic literature until Hongs (1978) recent integration of these
various aspects of study within a more comprehensive framework,
reveal significant aspects of special object attachments.
Gershaw and Schwarz (1971) found that when small children
experienced separation from the mother due to her absence in an
experimental setting that their distress was not alleviated by
familiar objects brought from

home.

No distinguishing criteria

were made though, between these objects and the special attachments
apparent with the transitional object.
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Weisberg and Russell (1971) investigated the role of blanket
attachments and its preference to other objects in the experimental
setting.

The findings suggest greater interaction by the child with

his or her own blanket, than to an unfamiliar blanket, a familiar
piece of clothing from home, or a foam cushion.

This was also evi

dent even in the presence of the mother.
Passman and Weisman (1975) in a large study involving 64 chil
dren, half of whom were attached to blankets, found similar functions
between the blanket and the mother.

Those children attached to blankets

and exposed to them played with little or no stress in a novel situation,
comparable to those children unattached to a blanket and in the mother's
presence.

The unattached children exhibited greater distress when

exposed to blankets or familiar toys or no objects and left to play
and explore a novel situation.

Clearly, the capacity of the blankets

to provide functions similar to those provided by the mother for the
attached children was evident.
From the empirical literature significant differences appear
among children attached to special objects as opposed to those that
are not.

These are generally supportive of the theoretical and clini

cal literature that views the transitional object as a critical feature
in the psychological development of the child.

Although many theore

ticians prefer not to separate specific transitional object attachments
from the broader perspective of transitional phenomena, it may be use
ful to do so.

That is, the "creation" of a concrete object may differ

significantly from less conspicuous transitional phenomena, such as a
sound, idea or even another person such as the mother or a sibling.
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Consideration of both as aspects of transitional experience on a con
tinuum may be more fruitful.

Though there may be more plasticity to

certain things considered transitional phenomena, the control one has
over a particular object may be more fully and directly experienced
for the child in his or her growing need to learn to mediate the
reality of the external world.

The Focus of This Study
The nature of the present study has been to focus upon the
transitional object, per se, as it functions in the above mentioned
developmental capacity and the relationship it has to one's function
ing as an adult.

Consideration has been directed toward whether the

person having created a transitional object during his or her early
childhood will have negotiated the separation-individuation process
more adequately than those who did not have such an object attach
ment.

Specifically, attention has been focused towards the impact

of one's early object attachments on the individual's psychological
functioning as an adult.

The literature suggests that the child who

has created a transitional object is actively engaged in the
separation-individuation process while symbolically recreating the
lost symbiosis with the mother.

The transitional object is thus

functioning to provide an intermediate area of experience that is
unchallenged and under the control of the child.

It does this by

maintaining the sense of control experienced in the symbiotic state
but gradually taking on new forms as differentiation proceeds.

The

transitional object is believed to help in the development of the
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individual's object relations as well as in the promotion of mature
personality functioning.
This study has attempted to demonstrate some relationships
between the presence of a transitional object in early childhood and
certain related aspects of functioning in early adulthood as measured
by several tests and scales.

The particular measures used to assess

differences in functioning between the Transitional Object Group and
the No Transitional Object Group were chosen for this study for sev
eral reasons.

First, these scales appear to be the most widely

explored and most frequently used measures of some of the dimensions
being explored in this study.

These include such aspects as the

degree of psychological differentiation, sense of control over one's
environment, as well as various personality variables that may be
related to the absence or presence of transitional object attachment.
Through a closer examination of the individual tests used (The
Internal-External Scale, The Group Embedded Figures Test, The This
I Believe Test, and The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire),
their relationship to the areas of exploration in this study will
become more evident.
The Internal-External (I-E) Scale as developed by Rotter
(1966) was employed to assess the degree to which an individual
feels in control over contingencies in their environment.

An indi

vidual with an internal locus of control will attribute responsibil
ity for his interactions and outcomes with the environment to him
self.

The individual with an external locus of control will attrib

ute the controlling factors to the environment rather than to his
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own skill and ability.

This reflects a tendency to rely on chance and

fate rather than to one's own resources.

It was hypothesized that per

sons having created transitional objects in early childhood will demon
strate greater internal locus of control than those who did not form
such an attachment.
The Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) was administered as a
means of assessing dimensions of psychological differentiation (Witkin,
Oltman, Raskin and Karp 1971).

The cognitive dimensions of field

dependence-independence and globality-articulation which this test
assesses have been related to the psychological dimensions of body
concept, sense of identity, and the nature of psychological defenses.
Field independent persons appear to have a more clearly defined sense
of self and body boundaries and also show greater separateness in
their identity sense as demonstrated in the ability to differentiate
aspects and feelings of self from other.

Field independent persons

have also been suggested to use more well defined defense mechanisms
than field dependent persons.

Relationships also exist between field

independence-dependence and types of psychopathology.

It was hypoth

esized that those individuals with transitional objects will demon
strate greater field independence and articulation of functioning
than those without transitional objects.
The This I Believe Test (TIB) was another measure administered
to assess psychological differentiation as based upon a concretenessabstractness dimension.

The scale measures this dimension through the

belief system of the individual as an interaction of ego-involving con
tent material and one's level of concreteness-abstractness.

Four

47

belief systems have been delineated which assess the psychological
aspects of degrees of individuation (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder 1961).
System 1 ;

These individuals show a general cognitive style

which reflects poor integration and differentiation.

They

tend to be dependent on external sources of authority,
inflexible, rule oriented, and highly conventional with a
strong need for structure.
System 2 ;

These individuals are characterized by a nega-

tivistic and anti-authoritarian nature.

There is a con

spicuous struggle for independence, yet it is tempered with
the fear of rejection and loss of security and control.
They are somewhat more differentiated than the System 1
individual though still poorly integrated.
System 3 :

These individuals are characterized by stable

interpersonal relationships which provides them with a
sense of control over their environment.

These relation

ships do reflect though, a dependent and manipulative
quality, which is the primary basis for their sense of
control.

There still remains some sense of vulnerability

to rejection.
System 4 :

These individuals reflect the highest level of

abstract functioning.

They tend to demonstrate indepen

dence without accompanying negative attitudes, internal
systems of control, a willingness to take novel approaches
to situations, and flexibility to change.
It was hypothesized that those persons with transitional
objects will show higher levels of differentiation as measured by
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these system levels than persons without transitional object attach
ments .
The TIB was also used in another fashion that is somewhat
afield from its intended design.

The nature of the content with

its highly ego Involving material seemed to make it an appropriate
means of tapping aspects of "transitional relatedness," which is
the ability to function in the transitional realm of experience.
This aspect of the TIB was included after the original design of
this study.
Certain aspects of transitional relatedness have been explored
in an earlier study comparing a clinical population to a control com
parison group along this dimension (Horton et al. 1974).

Again it was

hypothesized that those persons having had transitional objects would
demonstrate greater features of transitional relatedness than those
persons not having had such attachments.
The final tool implemented in assessing differences between
those individuals having had transitional objects and those without
transitional objects was the Sixteen Personality Factor (16PF) Ques
tionnaire (Cattell and Eber 1957).
of personality variables.

It is a comprehensive evaluation

The questionnaire was used in an explora

tory fashion and no predictions were made between the personality
characteristics of persons having created a transitional object in
early childhood and persons who have not.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subj ects

The subjects were 37 undergraduate students enrolled in an
introductory psychology course.

They were selected from 278 subjects

who had filled out a questionnaire (appendix A) about the nature of
special inanimate object attachments they may or may not have had as
small children.

Of the 37 subjects used in the study, 19 (8 male,

11 female) had transitional objects while 18 (9 male, 9 female) did
not.
The screening process of subject selection was based upon a
combination of self-reports and parental-reports as a means of cross
validation.
selected.

From self reports of the 278 initial subjects, 107 were
Of the 107 subjects, 55 had transitional objects while 52

gave no indication of a transitional object.

The criteria used for

determining those with transitional objects in early childhood from
those without such attachments were the following:
Transitional Object Group:

This group consisted of those

persons indicating a strong, singular attachment to a par
ticular object that occurred rather early in life, usually
during the first year, and persisted for a reasonable length
of time (approximately 1 year or longer).
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No Transitional Object Group:

This group consisted of those

persons indicating no clear cut attachments of the sort
described above.
From the 107 subjects selected based upon these criteria, 64
were willing to participate in the study.

To further ensure the accu

racy of the retrospective self-reports of these subjects, questionnaires
(appendix B) were sent to the parents of these 64 subjects.

These

reports were compared with the self-reports as a means of validating
the criteria proposed above.
the subject was eliminated.

If any significant discrepancies existed
As a result 27 subjects were disgarded.

Five subjects (3 with transitional objects, 2 without transitional
object as based upon self-reports) were eliminated as parental reports
were not returned.

Another 22 (11 with transitional objects, 11 with

out transitional objects based upon self reports) were eliminated due
to incongruities between reports by the subjects and reports by the par
ents.

Such discrepancies existed in the Transitional Object Group when

either the subject reported a special object and their parents did not,
or if the subject and parent reported different objects of importance.
In the No Transitional Object Group discrepancies involved parental
reports of special object attachments when the subject did not report
any.
In the final analysis 37 subjects remained.

Nineteen had tran

sitional objects based upon the specified criteria and consistency
between self and parental reports.

Eighteen indicated no evidence of

transitional object attachments which again was confirmed by both self
and parental reports.

I
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Measures
Internal-External Scale (I-E).

The Internal-External Scale is

a 29 question scale, used to assess internal versus external locus of
control.

Six of the items are fillers to help disguise the purpose of

the test.

It consists of forced choice response items focusing upon

one's beliefs about the world.

Test-retest reliability measures have

been demonstrated to be as high as .72 with combined male-female group
administrations 1 month apart.

Internal consistency measures have also

been shown to be moderately stable with estimates as high as .73 with
combined male-female group administrations (Rotter 1966).
Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT).

The Group Embedded Figures

Test is an adaptation of the Embedded Figures Test used to assess the
dimensions of field dependence-independence and globality-articulation
in cognitive style.
ones.

It consists of 7 practice items and 18 scorable

The Group Embedded Figures Test is a speed test which takes 20

minutes to administer.

Reliability measures of parallel forms produce

rates of .82 for males and females (Witkin et al. 1971).
This I Believe Test (TIB).

The This I Believe Test consists

of 10 referent items of social and personal involvement.

The subjects

are required to write their beliefs about these ego-involving items.
The test assesses psychological differentiation through a concretenessabstractness dimension.

Scoring is based upon this dimension of

concreteness-abstractness as a means of delineating psychological
differentiation on the 4 belief systems scales (Harvey et al. 1961).
The This I Believe Test was also used to assess the dimension
of "transitional relatedness."

The criteria established were based
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upon a modification of those used in an earlier investigation (Horton
et al. 1974).

The criteria included:

a sense of belongingness; having

emotional investments in others; a sense of connectedness and attach
ment; "soothing illusion" in one's experiences with others (e.g. family,
friends, religion, work); personal beliefs that are significantly impor
tant; ability to personalize and internalize; a sense of oneness and
wholeness; and a general experiencing of the "cultural field."
The absence of "transitional relatedness" was characterized by
criteria of:

impersonalization; not feeling closeness or attachment to

others; indifference; no strong personal beliefs; distancing of feelings;
and a general lack of experiencing in the "cultural field."
The This I Believe Test was scored blindly by two separate raters
on both aspects of its use in this study.

Reliability indices were com

puted between the raters.
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF).

The Sixteen

Personality Factor Questionnaire is a personality inventory consisting
of 187 items.

The questionnaire is based upon extensive factor analy

tic research upon thousands of questions to provide accurate and valid
indices on a wide range of personality traits.

For Form A concept

validities for the individual factors ranged from .35 to .92.

Test-

retest reliability measures for the various factors on Form A for short
intervals (2-7 days) ranged from .72 to .92.

With periods extending

from 2-48 months test-retest reliabilities ranged from .35 to .85
(Manual for the 16PF 1972).
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Procedure
The actual testing administration involved the 64 subjects
screened from the self-reports alone.
approximately equal groups but on

These subjects were tested in

three separate evenings.

Subjects

with transitional objects and those without transitional objects were
equally distributed among the groups.
2-2^ hours in duration.

The sessions were generally

The sequence of test presentation was the

same at each administration.

The order consisted of the Internal-

External Scale, The Group Embedded Figures Test, The This I Believe
Test, and The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire.
Each test came with prescribed instructions which were closely
adhered to.

They were also read aloud in each case by the test admin

istrator to further ensure that the directions were fully understood.
Though data was collected on 64 subjects, only the data on
the 37 subjects (19 with transitional objects, 18 without transi
tional objects) as validated by the self- and parental-reports were
used in the final analysis.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Treatment of the Data

Four test instruments were used in the present study to assess
aspects of a dichotomously defined dimension of Transitional Object
Attachment— No Traditional Object Attachment.

These four measures

(Internal-External Scale, Group Embedded Figures Test, This I Believe
Test, Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire) were used as predictor
variables of the dependent variable of Transitional Object— No Transi
tional Object Attachment.
sex and birth order.

Additional independent variables were age,

The data was analyzed using Multiple Regression

Analysis.

The Relationship of Personality Variables to
Transitional Object Attachment
In order to assess the effects of various personality factors
on transitional object attachment the Sixteen Personality Factor Ques
tionnaire was employed.
measures.

The 16PF produced two sets of personality

The first consisted of 16 primary factors while the second

set produced 4 second order variables.

Separate regression equations

were constructed for these two sets of predictor variables (see
tables 1 and 2).
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TABLE 1

MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT
FROM SIXTEEN PERSONALITY FACTORS
Source

df

SS

MS

F

£

Reserved (sizothymia) vs.
Outgoing (affectothymia)

1

1.0749

1.0749

5.95

.0241

Less Intelligent (lower
scholastic mental capacity)
vs. More Intelligent (higher
scholastic mental capacity)

1

.1438

.0438

.80

n. s .

Affected by Feelings (lower
ego strength) vs. Emotion
ally Stable (higher ego
strength)

1

.0000

.0000

.00

n. s.

Humble (submissiveness) vs.
Assertive (dominance)

1

.0156

.0156

.09

n.s.

Sober (desurgency) vs.
Happy-go-lucky (surgency)

1

.0785

.0785

.43

n.s.

Expedient (weaker superego
strength) vs. Conscientious
(stronger superego strength)

1

.0047

.0047

.03

n.s.

Shy (threctia) vs. Venture
some (parmia)

1

.1005

.1005

.56

n.s.

Tough-minded (harria) vs.
Tender-minded (premsia)

1

.0148

.0148

.08

n.s.

Trusting (alaxia) vs.
Suspicious (protension)

1

.0349

.0349

.19

n.s.

Practical (praxernia) vs.
Imaginative (autia)

1

.0046

.0046

.03

n.s.

Forthright (artlessness)
vs. Shrewd (shrewdness)

1

.0137

.0137

.08

n.s.

Placid (untroubled adequacy)
vs. Apprehension (guilt
proneness)

1

.0027

.0027

.01

n.s.
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TABLE 1— Continued

Source

df

SS

MS

F

£

Conservative (conservatism
vs. Experiment ing
(radicalism)

1

.0871

.0871

.48

n.s.

Group-dependent (group
adherence) vs. Selfsufficient (selfsufficiency)

1

.2463

.2463

1.36

n. s .

Undisciplined Self-Conflict
(low integration) vs. Con
trolled (high self-concept
control)

1

.0015

.0015

.01

n.s.

Relaxed (low ergic tension)
vs. Tense (high ergic
tension)

1

1.6090

1.6090

8.91

.0073

20

5.8106

.2905

Error (Residual)
Total SS - 9.24324

R2=.60942

p < .0791

TABLE 2
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT
FROM FOUR SECOND ORDER PERSONALITY VARIABLES

Source

df

SS

MS

F

£

Introversion vs. Extroversion

1

1.7460

1.7460

9.58

.0041

Low Anxiety v s . High Anxiety

1

1.1748

1.1748

6.45

.0162

Tenderminded Emotionality vs.
Tough Poise

1

.2624

.2624

1.44

n.s.

Subduedness vs. Independence

1

.1053

.1053

.53

n.s.

32

5.9547

.1861

Error (Residual)
Total SS - 9.24324

R2-.36935

p <.0043
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The analysis of the sixteen variable equation produced a squared
multiple R that accounts for 60.942% of the variance in the dependent
variable.

Significant effects were found in the Reserved (sizothymia)

vs. Outgoing (affectothymia) dimension (F“ 5.95, p <.0241) and the
Relaxed (low ergic tension) vs. Tense (high ergic tension) dimension
(F= 8.91, p <.0073).

These predictor variables considered alone in a

separate regression equation produced a squared multiple R that accounted
for 53.739% of the variance in the dependent variable.

The effects of

the remaining 14 variables did not significantly add to the predictive
power of the equation (F(14,20)= .2635, n.s.).
Inspection of the means for the Transitional Object Group and No
Transitional Object Group on the Reserved (sizothymia) vs. Outgoing
(affectothymia) dimension revealed that it was the No Transitional
Object Group that deviated from the norm on that factor.
tion was in the Reserved (sizothymia) direction.

This devia

On the Relaxed (low

ergic tension) vs. Tense (high ergic tension) dimension it was the
Transitional Object Group that deviated from the norm.

This occurred

in the Tense (high ergic tension) direction (see table 3).
In the second regression equation involving the 4 second order
predictor variables, a squared multiple R which accounted for 36.935%
of the variance in the dependent variable was produced.

Significant

effects were found in the Introversion vs. Extroversion dimension
(F= 9.58, p <.0041) and the Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety dimension
(F= 6.45, p <.0162).

These factors considered in a two variable

regression equation produced a squared multiple R that explains
33.942% of the variance in the dependent variable.

The effects of
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the other two variables which had been considered in the 4 variable
equation did not add to the predictive power of the equation (F(2,32)*
.7593, n.s.).
TABLE 3
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL OBJECT GROUP
AND NO TRANSITIONAL OBJECT GROUP ON TWO PERSONALITY FACTORS

Factor

Population Parameters*

Groups**
T.O.
N.T.O.

Reserved (sizothymia) vs.
Outgoing (affectothymia)

Mean
10.93
Std. Dev. 3.45

10.32
2.75

7.61
2.59

Relaxed (low ergic tension)
vs. Tense (high ergic
tension)

Mean
13.43
Std. Dev. 4.81

17.21
3.78

12.50
3.24

*Population Parameters
College Students
Males and Females: Form A
(based on 20 years; N=4272)
**Groups— T .0.= Transitional Object Group
N.T.O. = No Transitional Object Group

Inspection of the means for the Transitional Object Group and
No Transitional Object Group on the Introversion vs. Extroversion dimen
sion indicated that it was the No Transitional Object Group that deviated
from the norm on this factor.
direction.

The deviation was in the Introversion

On the Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety scale it was the Tran

sitional Object Group that deviated from the norm.
the High Anxiety direction (see table 4).

This occurred in
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TABLE 4

MEANS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL OBJECT GROUP AND NO TRANSITIONAL
GROUP ON TWO SECOND ORDER PERSONALITY FACTORS

Population Mean

Factor

Groups*
T.O.
N.T.O.

Introversion vs . Extroversion

5.5

5.85

4.60

Low Anxiety vs. High Anxiety

5.5

6.62

5.34

*Groups— T.O. = Transitional Object Group
N.T.O. = No Transitional Object Group

The Relationship of Psychological Differentiation
Variables to Transitional Object Attachment
Two measures used to focus upon the aspects of psychological
differentiation as related to transitional object attachment were the
Group Embedded Figures Test and This I Believe Test.

A two variable

regression equation was constructed to analyze the amount of variance
in the dependent variable predicted by these independent variables
(see table 5).
TABLE 5
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT FROM
PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION VARIABLES
Source

df

SS

MS

F

£

TIB

1

.0816

.0816

.30

n.s.

GEFT

1

.0114

.0114

.04

n.s.

34

9.1504

.2691

Error (Residual)
Total SS = 9.24324

r 2=

.00998

n.s.
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The analysis produced a squared multiple R explaining only .998%
of the variance in the dependent variable.

No significant effects were

found.

The Relationship of Transitional Relatedness
to Transitional Object Attachment
The dimension of transitional relatedness, as defined earlier,
was used as a predictor variable of transitional object attachment.
It was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (low transitional related
ness) to 5 (high transitional relatedness).

Two independent raters

were involved in the assessment of the dimension from the responses
given by the subjects to the TIB.

The raters scored the responses

blind as the group membership of the subjects (i.e., Transitional
Object Group or No Transitional Object Group).

Since the rating was

not a strict categorization but rather an impressionistic assessment
on this scale, a correlation between raters was done (r= .46868) as
an index of reliability.
The scores produced by both raters were placed in a two vari
able regression equation (see table 6).

The analysis produced a

squared multiple R that explained only 5.642% of the variance in the
dependent variable.

No significant effects were found.

The Relationship of Locus of Control to
Transitional Object Attachment
The dimension of Locus of Control as measured by the InternalExternal Scale was another variable used in predicting transitional
object attachment.

No significant relationship was found between the

locus of control variable and transitional object attachment (r= -.2089).
The correlation was in the expected direction as hypothesized.
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TABLE 6

MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT
FROM MEASURES OF TRANSITIONAL RELATEDNESS

Source

df

SS

MS

F

2

T.R. 1*

1

.4826

.4826

1.88

n.s.

T.R. 2**

1

.0229

.0229

.09

n.s.

34

8.7377

.2569

Error (Residual)
Total SS = 9.24324

R2= .05641

n.s.

*T.R. 1 = Transitional Relatedness (Rater 1)
**T.R. 2 = Transitional Relatedness (Rater 2)

The Relationship of Age, Sex and Birth Order
Variables to Transitional Object Attachment
The effects of age, sex and birth order were analyzed to deter
mine if they contributed any precision to the prediction of transitional
object attachment.

A 3 variable multiple regression equation was con

structed (see table 7).

The analysis produced a squared multiple R

which explained only 3.781X of the variance in the dependent variable.
No significant effects were found.

Summary of the Results
The analysis of the data revealed significant relationships
between the presence of a transitional object in early childhood and
the personality variables in the Tense (high ergic tension) directional
dimension and High Anxiety directional dimension of the Sixteen Person
ality Factor Questionnaire.

The absence of a transitional object
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TABLE 7

MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING TRANSITIONAL OBJECT ATTACHMENT
FROM AGE, SEX AND BIRTH ORDER

df

Source

SS

MS

F

£

Age

1

.0002

.0002

.00

n. s.

Sex

1

.0438

.0438

.16

n. s .

Birth Order

1

.2906

.2906

1.08

n. s.

33

8.9086

.2699

Error (Residual)
Total SS = 9.24324

R2= .0378

n. s.

attachment in early childhood was related to the personality variables
in the Reserved (sizothymia) directional dimension and Introversion
directional dimension, also of the Sixteen Personality Factor Ques
tionnaire.
There were no significant relationships found between the
Transitional Object Group and the No Transitional Object Group on
the psychological differentiation variables (GEFT, TIB), the vari
able of transitional relatedness (TIB), the locus of control vari
able (I-E Scale), and age, sex, and birth order variables.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The major findings of the present study demonstrated specific
personality characteristics which were related to the absence or
presence of a transitional object in early childhood.
The features of the personality factors related to the absence
of a specific object attachment were in the Reserved (sizothymia) and
Introverted directions of their respective dimensions on the 16PF.
The Reserved (sizothymia) factor reflects tendencies of aloofness,
detachment, and skepticism.

These characteristics correspond in a

descriptive manner to the psychiatric classification of schizoid
functioning.

The Introversion factor is indicative of shyness, self-

sufficiency, with general avoidance of interpersonal contact.

These

traits often reflect social inhibitions (Manual for the 16PF 1972;
Cattell and Eber 1957).
The personality factors related to the presence of transitional
object attachments were in the Tense (high ergic tension) and High
Anxiety directions of their respective dimensions on the 16PF.

The

Tense (high ergic tension) factor indicates excitability, restlessness,
and impatience.

Such persons are frustrated, driven, and overwrought.

Clinically this categorization has been corresponded to neurotic type
tendencies.

It has been interpreted as reflecting "undischarged and

partly uncontrollable libido" (Cattell and Eber 1957, p. 19).
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It
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seems to be energy in excess of the ego's ability to discharge it.

The

High Anxiety scale reflects common notions of anxiety often with accom
panying maladjustment.

Often this factor characterizes a tendency of

dissatisfaction with the ability to meet life's demands (Manual for the
16PF 1972; Cattell and Eber 1957).
No significant relationships were found between the presence or
absence of a transitional object attachment and the psychological dif
ferentiation scales (GEFT, TIB) and locus of control scale (IE).

There

were no significant relationships found between transitional related
ness and transitional object attachment.

Neither were there relation

ships found between age, sex, and birth order and the dependent variable,
though none were expected.
Although there were several hypotheses formed regarding these
variables and transitional object attachment, none were supported.

But

rather than concluding no relationships exist between transitional
object attachment and the concepts of psychological differentiation,
locus of control and transitional relatedness, it might be more accu
rate to assume no relationships exist between transitional object
attachment and the scales used to measure these dimensions.
The problem that exists has always been one that has hindered
attempts at empirical investigations of psychoanalytic theories.

Spe

cifically, this involves the problems that arise in methodologically
implementing devices to measure the often intangible concepts of psy
choanalysis (see Kline 1972 for a review of empirical research of
Freudian theory).

However, the transitional object by its very nature

as a concrete observable entity, provides a unique opportunity to

65

attempt assessment of psychoanalytic theory.

The problem does remain

in trying to objectively quantify a dynamically conceived developmental
phenomenon.

Though it exists for superficial scrutiny, as previous

descriptive studies of it have shown, its conceptualization in dynamic
terms presents difficult problems in finding empirical measures of the
psychological function it serves.
Two scales used in this study, for example, the GEFT and the
TIB, both measures of psychological differentiation, are cognitive in
their emphasis.

Such a focus limits the impact that libidinal factors

may contribute to the separation-individuation process and hence influ
ence the measurement of psychological differentiation.
Certain technical factors need to be considered in addition to
the problems existing due to the possible inadequacy of the scales to
assess the theoretical postulates underlying the development of the
transitional object.

The first involves the rather small size of the

groups used in the study.
difficult to find.

This makes small differences that may exist

Another problem is the subjective nature of the

TIB in both its usages, as an index of differentiation as well as in
measuring transitional relatedness.

This made scoring difficult and

reliability difficult to satisfactorily obtain.

The IE scale was

also problematic due to the apparent obviousness of socially desir
able responses.
In spite of the difficulties existing in empirically assessing
behavior in terms of psychoanalytic concepts, the 16PF produced distin
guishing differential characteristics between the Transitional Object
Group and the No Transitional Object Group.

Although it is not possible
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to accurately assess genetic-dynamic aspects of these differences from
information gained only from a personality inventory, it is apparent
that differences exist.

Speculation as to what these empirical differ

ences suggest in terms of the psychological processes involved is criti
cal to furthering the understanding and conceptualization of the role
and function of the transitional object or the absence of it in the
developmental process.
From the analysis of the data it appears that both the No Tran
sitional Object Group and the Transitional Object Group are demonstrat
ing some characteristics of pathological functioning.

Some mention

needs to be made first of the nature of the object attachments or lack
of them that these groups demonstrated.

Those in the No Transitional

Object Group very conspicuously lacked any special inanimate object
attachment while the Transitional Object Group demonstrated very strong
and persistent attachments to a singular inanimate object (these may
closely resemble the true transitional objects that Winnicott mentions
as being, at times, more important than the mother).

Selection of these

relatively extreme groups in terms of object attachment appeared neces
sary to maximize the differences between the two groups.

It may also be

that it created an artificial dichotomy of object usage.

The range of

object attachments may be more appropriately viewed on a continuum with
the extreme absence or presence of object usage not representing an
optimal state of affairs.
However, it should be noted that the pathological features of
these groups do not suggest the extreme forms of pathology that have
been found in objectless maternally deprived infants (Provence and
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Ritvo 1961) or the fetishistic manifestations of object usage by
extremely overfrustrated and overstimulated children (Sperling 1963;
Dickes 1963; Greenacre 1969).

The differences that exist here are

probably within more moderate limits.
These may be the kind of differences that exist within what
might be considered a range of normal variation.

Such differences

in terms of inanimate object attachment may be seen in the crosscultural studies (Gaddini 1970; Hong and Townes 1976).

These studies

found that infants experiencing a great deal of maternal contact and
apparently limited separation experiences rarely developed transi
tional object attachments.

Those with greater and more frequent

separation experiences and less contact with the mother especially
during bedtime were more likely to develop transitional object attach
ments.

Neither of these developmental patterns are seen as pathologi

cal yet the role of object attachments in both are obviously different.
What is apparent from the present study is that the experiences
leading to the development or absence of an inanimate object attachment
in early childhood are significant in terms of one's later psychologi
cal functioning.
These variations in transitional object development or absence
of its development may be closely tied to moderate vicissitudes in the
separation-individuation process described by Mahler (1975).

These are

vicissitudes involving both the infant's readiness for independent
functioning as well as the mother's role in allowing it to optimally
proceed, by neither being over-intrusive nor too distant and withdrawn.
The critical factors surrounding the more subtle early motherinfant experiences are the ones in need of further scrutiny particularly
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as they influence the development of transitional object attachments.
Experiences of frustration may be tied to this process, spe
cifically Kohut's (1971) concept of "optimal frustration" as it facil
itates the internalization of psychic structure via "transmuting
internalizations."
Though the transitional object has been suggested as providing
an intermediary form of structure during the separation-individuation
process (Tolpin 1971), the psychological functioning of the Transitional
Object Group in the present study appears to call into question the
soothing structure enhancing functions of very strong inanimate object
attachments.

Apparently these individuals in later life are lacking to

some degree the internal resources to deal comfortably and securely
with the world.

It may be possible that such rigid object attachments

do not indicate ongoing structure enhancing processes but rather uninte
grated external adaptations to the unresponsiveness and frustrations of
aspects of the environment.

In these cases it may be possible that the

soothing functions of the object do not "go-inside" as fully adequate
structure.

Surely the functions of a special object attachment are

only as good as the soothing functions experienced for the primary
object of importance (i.e., mother).
Winnicott (1953) has suggested that the transitional object
helps mediate the growing adaptations by the infant to the external
world and outer reality.

The strong and persistent attachment that

he believed were most healthy and characteristic of the true transi
tional object (i.e., more important, at times, than the mother), may
not necessarily be the most optimal.
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Winnicott realized the necessity of the gradual lessening of
the mother's adaptations to the infant as the maturation process pro
ceeds allowing the infant to make greater adaptations to failure and
frustration by the mother and environment.

It may be that as these

experiences of failure and frustration exceed the infant's capacity
to deal with them, the greater the attachment to an object may become,
and the longer they may persist.

Thus, though the adaptations are

within the normal range they are not optimal and hence not fully able
to help the individual deal with and tolerate frustration.
The absence of special object attachments, on the other hand,
may indicate a different kind of adaptation.

The characteristics of

the No Transitional Object Group demonstrate a detriment in the indi
vidual's ability to engage the world.

Unlike the Transitional Object

Group where an overt external adaptation is made, the No Transitional
Object Group may be demonstrating an internal adaptation to experi
ences with the environment.

The experiences that may be encountered

by these individuals are a world that is threatening due to its tend
ency to be impinging particularly in preventing the development of
independent functioning.

This would create the experience of a world

that is threatening and frustrating, and needs to be escaped from by
internal strategy mechanisms.

Thus, the internalization process of

incorporating soothing psychic structures would be interfered with
like the Transitional Object Group but with a different genetic com
ponent and different dynamic manifestation.
In light of the empirical results of the present study, the
major theoretical position supported in terms of the optimal usage
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of inanimate objects in early development is that proposed by Dickes
(1978).

Dickes has reserved the larger area of moderate usage of an

object as most indicative of the healthy use of objects.

His view can

best be expressed in the following:
Evidence points to the existence of a spectrum composed at
one end of children who make no special use of inanimate
objects other than for their enjoyment and at the other end
of those who use inanimate objects in a grossly pathological
manner. Between these extremes is the great middle group,
children who use a toy or an object to relieve anxiety and
discharge tension, but never rely on objects to such an
extent that the normal development fails. I have suggested
that the term transitional object be reserved for these
children, who never value their possessions more than their
mothers (p. 318).
From the present investigation it is clear that a need exists
for further empirical research in this fascinating "third area" of
experience.

For only by such efforts may conflicting theoretical

notions be resolved thus expanding the knowledge of transitional
object attachments and their role in the developmental process.

APPENDIX A

SELF REPORT QUESTIONNAIRE
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This is a questionnaire designed to explore important features of early
childhood.

Specifically, it will focus upon significant attachments

one may form to certain toys or objects.

Many children form these

attachments while many others do not, yet both are considered normal
and healthy modes of development.

This questionnaire requires you to

try to recall, as accurately as possible, these kind of experiences
from your early childhood.

If you do not actually remember these

experiences, yet they were related to you in later years by your par
ents or older siblings, please describe them anyway as they were
described to you.

Your cooperation in describing such experiences

will help to provide further understanding of the mental functioning
of children.

It should be noted that all information will remain

completely confidential.
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Name_____________________________

Date of Birth:___________________

Age:___________________

Place of Birth:__________________

Sex:___________________

Phone (local):___________________

Father's Occupation:__________________
Mother's Occupation:__________________

Parents Marital Status:

___Married

___Separated

___Divorced

___Deceased (please indicate dates of separa
tion, divorce, or death if applicable)

Do you have any brothers or sisters?
indicating their sex and age.

Please list them in birth order

As a child did you share a room with a sibling(s) or did you have your
own room?

(if shared, how many in the room)

As a child did you ever suck your thumb or fingers, use a pacifier, bite
your nails or any similar activity?

(please describe)

When you were a small child (approximately preschool age, 1-6 years) did
you have any special toy(s) or object(s) that was important to you?
blanket, teddy bear, stuffed animal, etc.)

(eg.

If so, please describe it.

If there was more than one mentioned, was there one that was most impor
tant or more important than the others.
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If you did have such a toy or object, please answer the following:
-Did your toy or object have a special name:

If so, what was it?

-Do you remember specifically receiving the toy or object, or does
it seem as though you

havealways remembered having it?

-In what situations, places, or times did you most often have it
with you.

(eg. bedtime, when lonely or afraid, when playing, etc.)

-Were there any special qualities about the toy or object that stand
out in your mind?

(eg. texture, color, smell, etc.)

-Was there anything else important about your toy or object that
has not been mentioned?

Did you ever have any sort of routine or ritual before going to sleep
as a child?

(eg. special song, story or activity, etc.)

Did you ever have an imaginary playmate as a child?
describe.

If so, please

APPENDIX B

PARENTAL REPORT QUESTIONNAIRE
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Dear___________________ .

Your child_________________ , has volunteered to participate in a study
designed to explore some important features of early childhood.

Spe

cifically, it will focus upon significant attachments a child may form
to certain toys or objects.

Many children form these attachments while

many others do not, yet both are considered normal and healthy modes of
development.

Your cooperation in describing such experiences, if

applicable to your child, is a necessary part of this study.

Your

responses will help provide further understanding of the mental func
tioning of children.

I hope that you will take a few minutes, as soon

as possible, to complete the following questions and return the ques
tionnaire in the enclosed stamp addressed envelope.

Your child will

receive extra credit needed to his or her psychology course average
upon its return.

It should be noted that all information will remain

completely confidential.

Sincerely,

Keith Cohen
Graduate Student
Department of Psychology
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Name of Child:________________________
Relationship to Child:

_____Mother

_____Father

_____Guardian

Did your son or daughter as a small child (approximately 6 mo. - 6 yrs.)
have any special toy(s) or object(s) that was important to them?
blanket, teddy bear, stuffed animal, etc.)

(eg.

If so, please describe.

If there were several such toys or objects, was there one that was most
important or more important than the others?

If your son or daughter did have such a toy or object, please answer the
following:
-At approximately what age did you notice its onset of use?

-Did the toy or object have a special name?

If so, what was it?

-Was the toy or object given to the child by yourself or someone
else as a present or was it something the child found for him
self or herself?

-In what situations, places or times did your child most often want
or require the toy or object?

(eg. bedtime, when left alone, when

playing, etc.)

-Until approximately what age did your child have his or her toy or
object?
given up?

Do you remember any specific incident in which it was
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-Did you primarily approve or disapprove of its use?

-Were there any special qualities about the toy or object that
stand out in your mind as being important to your child?

(eg.

texture, color, smell, etc.)

-Was there anything else important about your child's toy or
object that has not been mentioned?

As an infant did your son or daughter have his or her crib in your bed
room or did he or she have a separate room?

If your child shared your room, until what age did he or she do so?
After leaving your room did he or she share a room with an older child
or relative or have a separate room?

Did your son or daughter ever suck his or her thumb or fingers, use a
pacifier, bite his or her nails, or any other similar activity?

Did your son or daughter have any sort of routine or ritual before going
to sleep as a child?

(eg. special song, story, or activity, etc.)

Did your son or daughter have an imaginary playmate as a child?
please describe.

If so,

REFERENCES

Bak, R.

Distortions in the concept of fetishism.
of the Child. 1974, 29, 191-214.

Beres, D. Perception, imagination and reality.
of Psychoanalysis, 1960, 41, 327-334.

Psychoanalytic Study

International Journal

Busch, F. Dimensions of the first transitional object.
Study of the Child, 1974, 29, 213-229.

Psychoanalytic

Busch, F., Nagera, H., McKnight, J., & Pezzarossi, G. Primary transi
tional objects. Journal of the American Academy of Child
Psychiatry, 1973, 12, 193-214.
Buxbaum, E. Hair pulling and fetishism.
Child, 1960, 15, 243-260.

Psychoanalytic Study of the

Cattell, R., & Eber, H. Handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor
Questionnaire. Champaign, Illinois: Institute for Personality
and Ability Testing, 1957 (with 1964 supplementation).
Coppolillo, H. P. Maturational aspects of the transitional phenomena.
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1967, 48^, 237-246.
Deri, S.

Transitional phenomena: Vicissitudes of symbolization and
creativity. In S. Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collabor
ation with W. Muensterberger, Between reality and fantasy:
Transitional objects and phenomena. New York: Jason Aronson,
1978.

Dickes, R. Fetishistic behavior: A contribution to its complex developement and significance. Journal of the American Psycho
analytic Association, 1963, 11, 303-330.
Dickes, R. Parents, transitional objects, and childhood fetishes.
S. Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W.
Muensterberger, Between reality and fantasy: Transitional
objects and phenomena. New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Dinnage, R. A bit of light. In S. Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in
collaboration with W. Muensterberger, Between reality and
fantasy: Transitional objects and phenomena. New York:
Jason Aronson, 1978.

81

In

82

Ekecrantz, L. , & Rudhe, L. Transitional phenomena: Frequency, forms
and functions of specially loved objects. Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica, 1972, 4^, 261-273.
Fintzy, R. T. Vicissitudes of the transitional object in a borderline
child. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1971, 52,
102-114.
Fraiberg, S. Libidinal object constancy and mental representation.
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1969, 2A_, 9-47.
Freud, A. Normality and pathology in childhood.
national Universities Press, 1965.

New York:

Inter

Freud, S. [Fetishism] (J. Strachey, Ed. and trans.). New York:
Books, Inc., 1959.
(Originally published, 1927)

Basic

Furer, M. The development of a preschool symbiotic psychotic boy.
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1964, JL9, 448-469.
Gaddini, R. Transitional objects and the process of individuation: A
study in three different social groups. Journal of the American
Academy of Child Psychiatry, 1970, j5, 347-365.
Gershaw, N., & Schwartz, J. The effects of a familiar toy and mother's
presence on exploratory and attachment behavior in young chil
dren. Child Development, 1971, 4_2, 1662-1666.
Giovacchini, P. The impact of delusion and the delusion of impact:
Ego defect and the transitional phenomenon. In S. Grolnick
and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W. Muensterberger,
Between reality and fantasy: Transitional objects and phe
nomena . New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Greenacre, P. Certain relationships between fetishism and the faulty
development of the body image. Psychoanalytic Study of the
Child, 1953, 8, 79-98.
Greenacre, P. Further considerations regarding fetishism.
analytic Study of the Child, 1955, 10, 187-194.
Greenacre, P. Further notes on fetishism.
the Child, 1960, 15, 191-207.

Psycho

Psychoanalytic Study of

Greenacre, P. Perversions: General considerations regarding their
genetic and dynamic background. Psychoanalytic Study of the
Child, 1968, 23, 47-62.
Greenacre, P. The fetish and the transitional object.
Study of the Child, 1969, 24, 144-164.

Psychoanalytic

83

Greenacre, P. The transitional object and the fetish with special refer
ence to the role of illusion. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis , 1970, _51, 447-456.
Greenbaum, T. The "analyzing instrument" and the "transitional object."
In S. Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W.
Muensterberger, Between reality and fantasy: Transitional
objects and phenomena. New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Greenson, R. On transitional objects and transference. In S. Grolnick
and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W. Muensterberger,
Between reality and fantasy: Transitional objects and phe
nomena . New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Grolnick, S. Dreams and dreaming as transitional phenomena. In S.
Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W.
Muensterberger, Between reality and fantasy: Transitional
objects and phenomena. New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Harvey 0., Hunt D., & Schroder, H. Conceptual systems and personality
organization. New York: Wiley, 1961.
Hong, M.

The transitional phenomena: A theoretical integration.
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1978, 33_, 47-79.

Hong, K., 6 Townes, B. Infants' attachment to inanimate objects.
Journal of the Academy of Child Psychiatry, 1976, 15, 49-61.
Horton, P., Louy, T., & Coppolillo, H. Personality disorder and tran
sitional relatedness. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1974,
30, 618-622.
Kafka, J. The body as a transitional object: A psychoanalytic study
of self-mutilating patient. British Journal of Medical Psy
chology, 1969, 42, 207-212.
Kahne, M. On the persistence of transitional phenomena into adult life.
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1967, 4J3, 247-258.
Kaminer, H. Transitional object components in self and object relations.
In S. Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W.
Muensterberger, Between reality and fantasy: Transitional
objects and phenomena. New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Kestenberg, J. Transsensus-Outgoingness and Winnicott's intermediate
zone. In S. Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration
with W. Muensterberger, Between reality and fantasy: Transi
tional objects and phenomena. New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.

84

Kestenberg, J., & Weinstein, J. Transitional objects and body-image
formation. In S. Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collabora
tion with W. Muensterberger, Between reality and fantasy:
Transitional objects and phenomena. New York: Jason Aronson,
1978.
Kline, P. Fact and fantasy in Freudian theory.
Co. LTD., 1972.

London:

Methuen and

Kohut, H. The analysis of the self: A systematic approach to the
psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic personality dis
orders. New York: International Universities Press, 1971.
Mahler, M. On the first three subphases of the separation-individuation
process. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1972, 53,
333-338.
Mahler, M. , Pine, F., & Bergman, A. The psychological birth of the
human infant: Symbiosis and individuation. New York: Basic
Books, 1975.
Manual for the 16 PF. Champaign, Illinois:
and Ability Testing, 1972.

Institute for Personality

Metcalf, D., & Spitz, R. The transitional object: Critical develop
mental period and organizer of the psyche. In S. Grolnick and
L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W. Muensterberger,
Between reality and fantasy: Transitional objects and phe
nomena . New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Modell, A. Primitive object relationship and the predisposition to
schizophrenia. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,
1963, 44, 282-292.
Natterson, J. M. The self as a transitional object: Its relationship
to narcissism and homosexuality. International Journal of
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 1976, 5_, 131-144.
Parrish, D. Transitional objects and phenomena in a case of twinship.
In S. Grolnick and L. Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W.
Muensterberger, Between reality and fantasy: Transitional
objects and phenomena. New York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Passman, R., & Weisberg, P. Mothers and blankets as agents for pro
moting play and exploration by young children in a novel
environment. Developmental Psychology, 1975, 11, 170-177.
Provence, S., & Ritvo, S. Effect of deprivation on institutionalized
infants: Disturbances in development of relationship to
inanimate objects. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1961,
16, 189-205.

I

85

Riophe, H. On an early genital phase with an addendum on genesis.
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1968, ^3, 348-365.
Riophe, H., & Galenson, E. Infantile fetishism.
of the Child, 1973, 28, 147-166.

Psychoanalytic Study

Riophe, H., & Galenson, E. Some observations on transitional object
and infantile fetish. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1975, 44,
206-231.
Rose, G.

The creativity of everyday life. In S. Grolnick and L. Barkin
(Eds.) in collaboration with W. Muensterberger, Between reality
and fantasy: Transitional objects and phenomena. New York:
Jason Aronson, 1978.

Rotter, J. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external con
trol of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs: General and
Applied, 1966, j30, 1-28.
Rudhe, L., & Ekecrantz, L. Transitional phenomena.
Scandinavica, 1974, 5(3, 381-400.

Acta Psychlatrica

Searles, H. Transitional phenomena and therapeutic symbiosis. Inter
national Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 1975, 4_,
145-203.
Solomon, J. C. Fixed idea as an internalized transitional object.
American Journal of Psychotherapy, 1962, L6, 632-644.
Sperling, M. Fetishism in children.
32, 374-392.

Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1963,

Stevenson, 0. The first treasured possession.
the Child, 1954, 9, 199-217.

Psychoanalytic Study of

Tolpin, M. On the beginnings of a cohesive self: An application of the
concept of transmuting internalization to the study of the tran
sitional object and signal anxiety. Psychoanalytic Study of the
Child, 1971, 26, 316-354.
Volkan, V. Transitional fantasies in the analysis of a narcissistic per
sonality. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association,
1973, 21, 351-376.
Volkan, V., & Kavanaugh, J. The cat people. In S. Grolnick and L.
Barkin (Eds.) in collaboration with W. Muensterberger, Between
reality and fantasy: Transitional objects and phenomena. New
York: Jason Aronson, 1978.
Weisberg, P., & Russell, J. Proximity and interactional behavior of
young children in their "security" blankets. Child Development,
1971, 42, 1575-1579.

86

Winnicott, D. W. Transitional object and transitional phenomena. The
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1953, 34^ 89-97.
Winnicott, D. W.

Playing and reality.

New York:

Basic Books, 1971.

Witkin, H., Oltman, P., Raskin, E., & Karp, S. Manual: Embedded
Figures Test; Children's Embedded Figures Test; Group
Embedded Figures Test. Palo Alto, California: Consulting
Psychologists Press, Inc., 1971.
Wulff, M. Fetishism and object choice in early childhood.
analytic Quarterly, 1946, 15, 460-471.

Psycho

